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In description logic (DL), ABoxes are used for describing the state of affairs in an application
domain. We consider the problem of updating ABoxes when the state changes, assuming
that update information is described at an atomic level, i.e., in terms of possibly negated
ABox assertions that involve only atomic concepts and roles. We analyze such basic ABox
updates in several standard DLs, in particular addressing questions of expressibility and
succinctness: can updated ABoxes always be expressed in the DL in which the original
ABox was formulated and, if so, what is the size of the updated ABox? It turns out that
DLs have to include nominals and the ‘@’ constructor of hybrid logic for updated ABoxes to
be expressible, and that this still holds when updated ABoxes are approximated. Moreover,
the size of updated ABoxes is exponential in the role depth of the original ABox and the
size of the update. We also show that this situation improves when updated ABoxes are
allowed to contain additional auxiliary symbols. Then, DLs only need to include nominals
for updated ABoxes to exist, and the size of updated ABoxes is polynomial in the size of
both the original ABox and the update.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Description Logics (DLs) are a traditional family of knowledge representation formalisms which, in recent years, have
played an important role as a logical underpinning of ontology languages such as the W3C recommendation OWL [1]. In DLs,
a knowledge base (KB) typically consists of two parts: a TBox to store intensional knowledge, i.e., a general formalization of
the relevant concepts and relationships of the application domain; and an ABox to store extensional knowledge, i.e., instance
level assertions that describe the current state of affairs in the application. Just like database systems, DL knowledge bases
are not static entities, but have to be modiﬁed when the application domain evolves. This raises the fundamental update
problem, which consists of rewriting the knowledge base to incorporate new information from the application without
unnecessarily losing any existing knowledge. In the case of a DL knowledge base, at least three different incarnations of the
update problem can be distinguished:
• TBox updates, triggered by changes of the intensional knowledge of the application domain;
• ABox updates, which have to be carried out when the intensional knowledge remains stable, but the state of affairs in
the application changes;
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TBox and the ABox.
In typical applications, instance level knowledge stored in the ABox tends to change frequently whereas intensional knowl-
edge in the TBox often remains stable for longer periods of time. Moreover, automatic TBox modiﬁcations are rarely desired
because the TBox is typically the result of a careful and time-consuming manual modeling process, and thus its syntactic
structure should not be changed in a radical way.
These observations lead us to study ABox updates as a fundamental and basic form of updates in a DL context. A central
property of DL ABoxes is that they store incomplete knowledge, reﬂected by an open world semantics and the use of com-
pound logical expressions that can involve disjunction and existential quantiﬁcation. It follows that, technically, updating DL
ABoxes is equivalent to updating logical theories, a problem with a long tradition in both the database and AI communities
[4–8].
In the database and AI literature, for a long time no proper distinction was made between updates as studied in this
paper and the related notion of a revision. While the purpose of update is to bring the knowledge base up to date when
the world described by it changes, revision aims at incorporating new knowledge that was obtained about a static world.
Katsuno and Mendelzon [6] discuss this distinction in detail, show that update and revision are fundamentally different
operations, and give 8 postulates that any rational update operator should satisfy. The prototypical update semantics that
complies with these postulates is Winslett’s well-known PMA semantics [4] whose general idea can, in our context, be
stated as follows. The models of the original knowledge base K are viewed as those states of the world that are considered
possible; when K is to be updated with new information U , then the models of the resulting updated knowledge base
K′ should satisfy U , but also be ‘as close as possible’ to the models of K (the principle of minimal change). In the case
of updating propositional theories and logical databases as considered in [6,4], the diﬃculty of deﬁning what ‘as close as
possible’ means mainly derives from the following two features: (i) the newly added information may be non-deterministic,
e.g. when it involves disjunction; and (ii) the updated theory must satisfy additional domain constraints stated in the
form of a logical background theory. As discussed in more detail in Section 6 of this paper, the combination of these
features with the ﬁrst-order quantiﬁcation present in description logics leads to serious semantic diﬃculties and also to
computational problems. For this reason, we concentrate on a simple, yet fundamental form of update where (i) the newly
added information U consists of a set of ground literals, i.e., sets of ABox assertions A(a) or r(a,b) and their negations,
where A is a concept name and r a role name (thus both are atomic); and (ii) no background theory is present, i.e., the
knowledge base K comprises only an ABox, but no TBox. In this case, there seems to be only one sensible formalization
of ‘as close as possible’: the models of K′ are obtained from the models of K by (deterministically!) applying the changes
dictated by the ground literals in U . This semantics, which we adopt in the current paper, can thus be viewed as an
incarnation of Winslett’s semantic that avoids the potentially controversial cases.
As a starting point for the current paper, we observe that, in standard ‘expressive’ DLs such as those between ALC and
ALCQIO, we can ﬁnd an ABox A and update U of the restricted form described above such that the result of updating
A with U cannot be expressed in the given DL. As a concrete example, take the following ABox A, which is formulated in
ALC , the basic expressive DL with Boolean operators. It states that John is a parent with only happy children, that Peter is
his child, and that Mary is a person:
john:Person  ∃has-child.Person  ∀has-child.(Person  Happy)
has-child(john,peter)
mary:Person.
Suppose now that the situation changes by Mary becoming unhappy. The result of updating A with U = {Mary : ¬Happy} can
be represented by the following ABox A′ , which is formulated in ALCO, the extension of ALC with nominals (individual
names inside concept descriptions):
john:Person  ∃has-child.Person  ∀has-child.(Person  (Happy unionsq {mary}))
has-child(john,peter)
mary:Person  ¬Happy.
To understand why A′ is appropriate, note that A provides no information about whether or not Mary is a child of John.
Because we cannot exclude that this is the case, John may now have an unhappy child, which is Mary. Thus, the new
knowledge concerning Mary also resulted in an update of the knowledge concerning John. Using the nominal {mary} in
the assertion for john is actually unavoidable as it can be shown that there is no ALC-ABox that is equivalent to the
ALCO-ABox A′ . As a consequence, the update of the ALC-ABox A with U cannot be expressed in ALC .
We say that a description logic L does not have updates if there are an L-ABox A and update U such that the result
of updating A with U cannot be expressed in L. The ﬁrst main aim of this paper is to understand how the problem of non-
expressibility of updated ABoxes can be overcome. In particular, we consider two options: (i) increasing the expressive power of
DLs by adding additional constructors and (ii) relaxing the deﬁnition of updated ABoxes.
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suﬃces to ensure the existence of updated ABoxes in all DLs between ALC and ALCQIO. Intuitively, the ‘@’ constructor
enables ‘jumps’ between individuals by allowing the formation of concepts such as @aC which is satisﬁed at any point of an
interpretation whenever the individual a satisﬁes the concept C . We also show that the ‘@’-constructor (but not nominals)
can be replaced by Boolean ABoxes, i.e., ABoxes that admit Boolean operators to be applied to ABox assertions.
Regarding (ii), we consider the following deﬁnitions of updated ABoxes. An ABox A′ is
• a semantic update of A with U if the models of A′ are precisely those interpretations that can be obtained from models
of A by making the assertions in U true (the standard deﬁnition);
• an approximate update of A with U regarding a DL L if A′ entails exactly the same L-ABox assertions as the semantic
update of A with U ;
• a projective update of A with U if the models of A′ are precisely the models of the semantic update, after projecting
both to the symbols in A and U ;
• a projective approximate update of A with U if A′ entails exactly the same L-ABox assertions ϕ as the semantic update
of A with U as long as ϕ uses only symbols from A and U .1
Observe that projective updates allow the use of fresh, auxiliary symbols in A′ , and so do projective approximate updates.
Also note that (projective and non-projective) approximate updates have an additional parameter, which is the DL L in
which entailed ABox assertions are formulated. It is not hard to see that every semantic update is also an approximate
update and a projective update, which in turn are also projective approximate updates. Moreover, semantic updates and
approximate updates can be proved to be logically equivalent, if the former exists. Due to the new symbols, this is in
general not true for projective updates. Similar forms of updates have been considered e.g. in [9,11], see Section 7 for more
details.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the more relaxed deﬁnitions of updated ABoxes only rarely help to overcome the problem
of DLs not having updates. More precisely, all DLs considered in this paper have approximate updates if, and only if, they
have semantic updates. Projective updates are slightly more well-behaved: using a simple trick, one can see that a DL L has
projective updates if the extension of L with the ‘@’ constructor has semantic updates. Thus, we can ensure the existence of
projective updates in the DLs between ALC and ALCQIO by adding only nominals (but not the ‘@’ constructor). Further
relaxing projective updates to projective approximate updates turns out to not improve this situation.
The second main question studied in this paper concerns the size of updated ABoxes. The ﬁrst relevant observation is that
our construction of semantic updates in DLs that comprise nominals and the ‘@’ constructor incurs an exponential blowup
in the size of the update U and in the role depth of the original ABox A, i.e., the nesting depth of existential and universal
restrictions in A. Although both measures are typically small in real applications, this raises the questions (i) whether
an exponential blowup of semantic updates can be avoided by a more careful construction and (ii) whether other forms
of update help to avoid an exponential blowup. Concerning (i), we show that an exponential blowup cannot be avoided
unless NP ∩ co-NP is contained in the non-uniform version of the complexity class NC1, which is considered very unlikely
in complexity theory. Note that similar results such as those obtained by Cadoli et al. in [9] are not applicable due to the
restricted form of updates considered in this paper (however, our results strengthen some of the results obtained by Cadoli
et al.) Giving a positive answer to (ii), we then show that switching from semantic updates to projective ones dramatically
improves the situation: in DLs that comprise nominals, not only the existence of projective updates is guaranteed, but it is
even possible to construct projective updates whose size is polynomial both in the size of the original ABox and the update.
Thus, projective updates are particularly well-suited for use in practical applications. We note that similar observations
have already been made for the case of propositional logic in [9], where it is shown that for some update semantics, the
projective version of updates is more succinct than the non-projective one.
Finally, we extend our update constructions to conditional updates, which can express statements such as ‘A(a) is true
after the update if C(b) was true before’. We then apply the extended results to reasoning about actions in a DL context,
as recently proposed and studied in [12–14]. In particular, we show that our construction of updated ABoxes can be used
to implement a progression approach to the central projection problem [7], reproving a number of tight upper complexity
bounds for this problem that have originally been obtained using the method of regression.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief introduction to description logics, deﬁne the various
kinds of ABox updates studied in this paper, and present some basic results regarding these updates. In particular, we
interrelate the various deﬁnitions of updated ABoxes and prove that the ‘@’ constructor is intimately related to projective
updates, and to Boolean ABoxes.
The non-existence of updated ABoxes in standard expressive DLs of the ALC family is established in Section 3. We
prove that DLs between ALC and ALCQI@ do not have approximate projective updates, and that DLs between ALCO
and ALCQIO do not have approximate updates. This section is actually the only one where we explicitly consider
1 Actually, the ‘real’ deﬁnitions of projective updates and projective approximate updates are slightly stronger and use different (but more complicated
to describe) sets of symbols. We refer to Deﬁnition 4 for full details.
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(projective or non-projective) approximate updates since the positive results in subsequent sections all hold for stronger,
non-approximating deﬁnitions of updated ABoxes.
In Section 4, we show that adding nominals and the ‘@’ constructor to the DLs ALC , ALCI , ALCQ, and ALCQI suf-
ﬁces to have semantic updates. We also establish the single-exponential size of updated ABoxes announced before, both for
the case of single updates and iterated updates. We prove that an exponential blowup of updated ABoxes cannot be avoided,
subject to the complexity-theoretic assumption that NP∩co-NP NC1. Finally, we consider an extension of ALCQIO@ with
certain role constructors which allows a simple construction of updated ABoxes that are exponential only in the size of the
update, but not in the size of the original ABox.
We then focus on projective updates in Section 5, showing that they are enjoyed by all DLs between ALCO and
ALCQIO@, including those that do not comprise the ‘@’ constructor. We also show that projective updates can be con-
structed in polynomial time such that the resulting updated ABox is of polynomial size. With a small trick, these time and
space bounds also apply to the case of iterated updates.
Section 6 is devoted to conditional updates and their application to reasoning about actions using DLs. Finally, Section 7
wraps up the paper, analyzing some possible extensions of our results (e.g. with TBoxes) and discussing related work.
This paper is a signiﬁcantly extended and revised version of [15].
2. Preliminaries and basic deﬁnitions
We provide a brief introduction to description logics, deﬁne the various kinds of ABox updates studied in this paper, and
present some basic observations regarding these updates. For the sake of readability, proofs for the results in this section
are deferred to Appendix A.
2.1. Description logics
We introduce the expressive description logic ALCQIO@ and its fragments studied in this paper. Our presentation will
be brief and the reader is referred to [1] for more details. In DLs, concepts are inductively deﬁned with the help of a set
of constructors, starting with a countably inﬁnite set NC of concept names, a countably inﬁnite set NR of role names, and
(possibly) a countably inﬁnite set NI of individual names. ALCQIO@-concepts are formed using the constructors shown in
Fig. 1. There, the inverse constructor is the only role constructor (used to construct compound roles), whereas the remaining
seven constructors are concept constructors (used to construct compound concepts). A role is either a role name r or the
inverse r− of a role name r. In Fig. 1 and throughout the paper, we use #S to denote the cardinality of a set S , a and b to
denote individual names, r and s to denote roles, A, B to denote concept names, and C , D to denote (possibly compound)
concepts. As usual, we use 	 as abbreviation for an arbitrary (but ﬁxed) propositional tautology, ⊥ for ¬	, → and ↔ for
the usual Boolean abbreviations, ∃r.C (existential restriction) for ( 1 r C), and ∀r.C (universal restriction) for ( 0 r ¬C).
The fragment of ALCQIO@ that allows only for negation, conjunction, disjunction, and universal and existential restric-
tions is called ALC . The availability of additional constructors is indicated by concatenation of a corresponding letter: Q
stands for number restrictions; I stands for inverse roles, O for nominals and superscript ‘@’ for the @ constructor. This
explains the name ALCQIO@ for our DL, and also allows us to refer to fragments in a simple way. In particular, when we
speak of all DLs between ALC and ALCQIO, we mean the logics L that can be obtained from ALC by all possible combi-
nations of Q, I , and O. In particular, ALC and ALCQIO themselves are regarded as DLs between ALC and ALCQIO.
In the same way, we speak about all DLs between ALC@ and ALCQIO@ and, in general, about all DLs between any two
descriptions logics. We note that, while the ‘@’ constructor from hybrid logic [16] is somewhat unusual in a DL context, it
will play an important role in the computation of updates later on.
The semantics of ALCQIO@-concepts is deﬁned in terms of an interpretation I = (I , ·I). The domain I is a non-
empty set of individuals and the interpretation function ·I maps
• each concept name A ∈ NC to a subset AI of I ,
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• each individual name a ∈ NI to an element aI ∈ I such that aI = bI whenever a and b are distinct (the unique name
assumption, UNA).
The extension of ·I to inverse roles and arbitrary concepts is deﬁned inductively as shown in the third column of Fig. 1.
Two concepts C and D are equivalent, written C ≡ D , iff CI = DI for all interpretations I .
In DLs, extensional knowledge is stored in an ABox. An ALCQIO@-ABox is a ﬁnite set of concept assertions C(a), role
assertions r(a,b), and negated role assertions ¬r(a,b), where r is a role name. For readability, we sometimes write concept
assertions as a:C . As an abbreviation, we write r−(a,b) ∈ A if r(b,a) is contained in the ABox A; similarly, ¬r−(a,b) ∈ A
abbreviates ¬r(b,a) ∈ A. Observe that there is no need for explicitly introducing negated concept assertions due to the
availability of negation as a concept constructor in ALCQIO@ and its fragments. An ABox A is simple if C(a) ∈ A implies
that C is a concept literal, i.e., a concept name or a negated concept name. We use Ind(A) to denote the set of all individual
names a used in the ABox A (i.e., all a such that there exists C(a) ∈ A or there exists C(b) ∈ A such that @a or {a} occurs
in C ) and role(A) to denote the set of role names used in A.
An interpretation I satisﬁes a concept assertion C(a) iff aI ∈ CI , a role assertion r(a,b) iff (aI ,bI) ∈ rI , and a negated
role assertion ¬r(a,b) iff (aI ,bI) /∈ rI . We write I | ϕ to denote satisfaction of an ABox assertion ϕ by an interpretation
I . This notation is lifted to sets of interpretations Γ in the obvious way, i.e., we write Γ | ϕ iff I | ϕ for all I ∈ Γ . An
interpretation I is a model of an ABox A, written I |A, if I | ϕ for all ϕ ∈ A.
We use M(A) to denote the set of all models of the ABox A. An ABox is consistent iff M(A) = ∅. Two ABoxes A
and A′ are equivalent, written A ≡ A′ , iff M(A) = M(A′). An ABox assertion ϕ is a consequence of an ABox A, written
A | ϕ , if M(A) ⊆ M({ϕ}). This notion is lifted to ABoxes in the obvious way: A′ is a consequence of A, written A | A′ , if
M(A) ⊆ M(A′).
2.2. Semantic updates
We introduce the most natural form of ABox updates which we call ‘semantic’ because of their purely model-theoretic
deﬁnition. Such updates have also been called ‘logical’ updates in the literature, see for example [9]. We start with consid-
ering the update of an interpretation rather than an ABox.
Deﬁnition 1 (Interpretation update). An update U is a consistent simple ABox. Let U be an update and I an interpretation.
Deﬁne an interpretation IU by setting, for all individual names a, concept names A, and role names r:
I
U = I
aI
U = aI
AI
U = (AI ∪ {aI ∣∣ A(a) ∈ U})∖{aI ∣∣¬A(a) ∈ U}
rI
U = (rI ∪ {(aI ,bI) ∣∣ r(a,b) ∈ U})∖{(aI ,bI) ∣∣¬r(a,b) ∈ U}.
IU is called the result of updating I with U .
As the next step, updates are lifted to the level of ABoxes, which represent classes of models rather than single models
as in Deﬁnition 1.
Deﬁnition 2 (Semantic update). Let A be an ALCQIO@-ABox and U an update. Deﬁne the class of updated models as
M(A)U = {IU ∣∣ I ∈ M(A)}.
An ALCQIO@-ABox A′ is a semantic update of A with U , written A ⇒U A′ , if
M
(A′)= M(A)U .
A description logic L has semantic updates if for every L-ABox A and update U , there is an L-ABox A′ with A ⇒U A′ .
To illustrate Deﬁnition 2, consider the following ABox E , which we use as a running example:
john : ∃has-child.Happy
mary : Happy  Clever.
The following ABox E ′ is a semantic update of E with U = {¬Happy(mary)}:
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mary : ¬Happy  Clever.
To understand the disjunction, note that there are two kinds of models of E : those where John has a happy child that
is not Mary, and those where Mary is the only happy child of John. In models of the former kind, John still satisﬁes
∃has-child.Happy after the update (ﬁrst disjunct); in models of the latter kind, Mary is still a child of John after the update
(second disjunct). For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof of the following in Appendix A:
Observation 1. E ⇒U E ′ .
As captured by the following lemma, semantic updates are unique up to logical equivalence and do not depend on the
syntactic presentation of the original ABox. The lemma is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of semantic updates.
Lemma 1. Let A1 , A2 , A′1 , A′2 be ALCQIO@-ABoxes. Then A1 ≡A2 and Ai ⇒U A′i for i ∈ {1,2} imply A′1 ≡ A′2 .
We remark that making the UNA, as we do, has an impact on semantic updates. To show the difference between updates
with UNA and without, consider the ABox A = {A(a1)} and the update U = {¬A(a2)}, where a1 = a2. Then A ∪ U is a
semantic update of A with U under UNA, but the semantic update of A with U without UNA is
U ∪ {a1 : ({a2} unionsq A)}.
Thus, dropping the UNA results in a case distinctions regarding the identity of the individual names a1 and a2. Apart from
such case distinctions, dropping the UNA poses no major technical problems.
Semantic updates are, in a sense, the ‘ideal’ kind of update. However, it turns out that many standard DLs such as ALC
do not have semantic updates. For example, it can be proved that for the above ALC-ABox A and update U , there is no
semantic update in ALC (and thus we had to resort to the ALCO-ABox A′ for presenting the semantic update). This
problem, which is studied in detail in Section 3, motivates the consideration of other, weaker forms of updates.
2.3. Approximate updates
We obtain a weaker form of update by considering the logical consequences of ABoxes instead of their models. This
approach to weakening updates has been introduced in a DL context in [11].
Deﬁnition 3 (Approximate updates). Let A be an ALCQIO@-ABox, U an update, and L a description logic. An ALCQIO@-
ABox A′ is an approximate update of A with U regarding L, written A −→LU A′ , if for all L-ABox assertions ϕ , we have
M(A)U | ϕ ⇔ M(A′) | ϕ.
A description logic L has approximate updates if for every L-ABox A and update U , there is an L-ABox A′ with A −→LU A′ .
As an example, reconsider the example ALC-ABox E and update U from Section 2.2. The following ALC-ABox E ′′ is an
approximate update of E with U regarding ALC:
john : ∃has-child.(Happy unionsq Clever)
mary : ¬Happy  Clever.
Indeed, we prove in Appendix A:
Observation 2. E −→ALCU E ′′ .
Recall that, in contrast, there is no ALC-ABox that is a semantic update of E with U .
We now relate approximate updates to semantic updates in a precise way. If a semantic update exists, then an ABox is
an approximate update regarding a DL L iff it has the same L-consequences as the semantic update. This is Point 1 of the
following lemma, and it is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of approximate updates. Point 2 follows from Point 1
and asserts that semantic updates are approximate updates regarding any DL L.
Lemma 2. Let A and A′ be ALCQIO@-ABoxes, U an update, and L a description logic. Assume A ⇒U As . Then
1. A −→LU A′ iff for all L-ABox assertions ϕ , A′ | ϕ ⇔ As | ϕ;
2. A −→LU As .
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the choice of L can make a difference: the ALCO-ABox E ′ from Section 2.2 is a semantic update of E with U , thus by
Lemma 2 also an approximate update of E with U regarding ALCO. Since clearly E ′ and the above E ′′ have different
ALCO-consequences, E ′′ is not an approximate update of E with U regarding ALCO. However, as observed above, E ′′ is
an approximate update of E with U regarding ALC .
We can derive interesting additional properties of approximate updates regarding a DL L when we demand that the
updated ABox is formulated in the same DL L, as in the deﬁnition of L ‘having approximate updates’. Then, approximate
updates are unique up to logical equivalence and also equivalent to semantic updates, if the latter exist. This is captured by
Points 1 and 2 of the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let A1 and A2 be ALCQIO@-ABoxes, U an update, L a description logic, and A′1 , A′2 L-ABoxes. Then
1. A1 ≡A2 and Ai −→LU A′i for i ∈ {1,2} imply A′1 ≡ A′2;
2. A1 −→LU A′1 and A1 ⇒U A′2 imply A′1 ≡ A′2 .
Point 1 is an immediate consequence of the fact that for any two L-ABoxes A and A′: A | ϕ iff A′ | ϕ for all L-ABox
assertions ϕ implies A |A′ and A′ |A, which in turn implies A ≡ A′ . Point 2 follows together with Point 2 of Lemma 2.
Note that, by Point 1 of Lemma 3, approximate updates do not depend on the syntactic presentation of the original ABox.
We remark that approximate updates are less generally useful than semantic ones. In particular, one main use of DL
ABoxes is for query answering, see for example [2,17,3]. While semantic updates give correct answers to queries formulated
in any query language, approximate updates do not. For example, it follows directly from the deﬁnition that approximate
updates regarding a DL L give correct answers to instance queries C(a) with C formulated in L, but this is not true for
unions of conjunctive queries (UCQs): the individual name john is not included in the certain answer to the following UCQ
q(x) when posed to the approximate update E ′′ of E with U regarding ALC given above:
q(x) = has-child(x,mary)∨ (∃y.has-child(x, y) ∧ Happy(y)).
In contrast, john is included in the certain answer to q(x) when posed to the semantic update E ′ of E with U given in
Section 2.2.
2.4. Semantic projective updates and approximate projective updates
Although weaker, approximate updates turn out to be almost as elusive as semantic ones and are not enjoyed by many
standard DLs, see Section 3. For this reason and to overcome the exponential blowup that we will encounter in the con-
struction of semantic updates (when they exist), we consider an additional way of relaxing updated ABoxes, namely to allow
additional ‘auxiliary’ symbols (concept names, role names, and individual names) in the updated ABox. This can be done
both for semantic updates and approximate updates, which gives rise to the four forms of update studied in this paper.
Updates admitting auxiliary symbols have been studied in [9,10] in a propositional logic context.
Elements of NC ∪ NR ∪ NI are called symbols. A signature is a set of symbols. The signature sig(C) of a concept C is the set
of symbols that occur in C . The signature sig(A) of an ABox A is deﬁned likewise; in particular all individual names used
in A are included in sig(A). For a signature S , we use S to denote (NC ∪ NR ∪ NI) \ S . The reduct IS of an interpretation
I to a signature S is the interpretation obtained from I by ‘forgetting’ the interpretation of all symbols that are not in S;
i.e., IS interprets only the symbols in S , but not other symbols. The notion of reducts is lifted to classes of models M by
setting MS = {IS | I ∈ M}.
Deﬁnition 4 (Projective updates). Let A and A′ be ALCQIO@-ABoxes, U an update, and L a description logic. Then Fr(A′) =
sig(A′) \ (sig(A) ∪ sig(U)) is the set of fresh symbols of A′ . We call A′ a
• semantic projective update of A with U , written A ⇒pU A′ , if
M
(A′)Fr(A′) = M(A)UFr(A′);
• approximate projective update ofAwith U regardingL, written A −→p,LU A′ , if for all L-assertions ϕ with sig(ϕ) ⊆ Fr(A′),
we have
M(A)U | ϕ ⇔ M(A′) | ϕ.
A description logic L
• has semantic projective updates iff for every L-ABox A and every update U , there is an L-ABox A′ such that A ⇒p A′;U
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A −→p,LU A′ .
As an example, consider the following ABox F
john : ∃has-friend.Smart
and update U = {¬has-friend(john,mary)}. We will show in the proof of Theorem 2 that there is no L-ABox that is a
semantic update of F with U and neither an L-ABox that is an approximate update of F with U regarding L, for many
DLs L including ALC and ALCO. However, we ﬁnd a semantic projective update F ′ formulated in ALCO that consists of
U and
john : (∃has-friend.Smart) unionsq ∃r.({mary}  Smart),
where r is a fresh role name.
Observation 3. F ⇒pU F ′ .
We leave a formal proof of Observation 3 to the reader and only give an intuition of why F ′ is a semantic projective
update. Again, there are two kinds of models of A: those where John has a smart friend that is not Mary, and those where
Mary is the only smart friend of John. In models of the former kind, John still satisﬁes ∃has-friend.Smart after the update
(ﬁrst disjunct); in models of the latter kind, Mary is still smart after the update. This is expressed by the second disjunct,
where the role name r only serves the technical purpose of ‘jumping’ from John to Mary in updated interpretations.
It is not hard to establish the following analogue of Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Let A and A′ ALCQIO@-ABoxes, U an update, L a description logic, and assume A ⇒pU As . Then
1. A −→p,LU A′ iff for all L-ABox assertions ϕ with sig(ϕ) ⊆ Fr(A′) ∪ Fr(As), we have A′ | ϕ ⇔ As | ϕ;
2. A −→p,LU As .
Concerning analogues of Lemmas 1 and 3, an obvious ﬁrst observation is that, due to the use of fresh symbols, semantic
projective updates need not be logically equivalent to each other, and neither do approximate projective updates. However,
it is still a consequence of Deﬁnition 4 that semantic projective updates and approximate projective updates do not depend
on the syntactic form of the original ABox.
Lemma 5. Let A1 , A2 , and A′ be ALCQIO@-ABoxes, U an update, and L a description logic. Then
1. A1 ≡A2 and A1 ⇒pU A′ imply A2 ⇒pU A′;
2. A1 ≡A2 and A1 −→p,LU A′ imply A2 −→p,LU A′ .
2.5. The ‘@’ constructor, Boolean ABoxes and projective updates
The example in Section 2.2 illustrates that, sometimes, nominals can help to overcome the non-existence of updates.
The example in Section 2.4 shows that the same is true for projective updates. Indeed, we will show that among the
DLs introduced in Section 2.1, exactly the DLs that include nominals have semantic projective updates (but not necessarily
non-projective updates). Interestingly, the positive effects of projective updates (but not those of nominals) can also be
attained in two other ways: by adding the ‘@’ concept constructor as introduced in Section 2.1 and by replacing ABoxes
with Boolean ABoxes. The latter are sets of Boolean ABox assertions, i.e., combinations of ABox assertions expressed in terms
of the connectives ∧ and ∨ (recall that ABox assertions are already closed under negation).
For illustration, reconsider the example from Section 2.4, i.e. the ABox F = {john : ∃has-friend.Smart} update U =
{¬has-friend(john,mary)}. Recall that the semantic projective update F ′ of F consists of U and
john : (∃has-friend.Smart) unionsq ∃r.({mary}  Smart).
To eliminate the auxiliary symbol r and thus obtain a semantic non-projective update, we can use the ‘@’ concept constructor
and replace the above assertion with
john : (∃has-friend.Smart) unionsq@marySmart.
Alternatively, we can eliminate the symbol r by using Boolean ABoxes, replacing the above assertion with
(john : ∃has-friend.Smart)∨ (mary : Smart).
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nominals: in general, we might still have to use nominals even when the ‘@’ constructor or Boolean ABoxes are admitted.
Indeed, we will show that among the DLs introduced in Section 2.1, exactly those have semantic (non-projective!) updates
that comprise nominals and the ‘@’ constructor. A similar statement can be formulated for Boolean ABoxes.
The aim of the current section is to present some basic observations regarding the relationship between the ‘@’ construc-
tor, Boolean ABoxes, and projective updates. The following lemma shows that non-Boolean L@-ABoxes have exactly the same
expressive power as Boolean L-ABoxes provided that L contains nominals. This does not hold, e.g., for ALC: while every
ALC@-ABox can be translated into an equivalent Boolean ALC-ABox, it can be proved that no non-Boolean ALC@-ABox is
equivalent to the Boolean ALC-ABox {A(a)∨ r(b, c)}. A proof of the following lemma can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 6.
1. Let L be a DL between ALC and ALCQIO. Then for every Boolean L@-ABox, there exists an equivalent Boolean L-ABox;
2. Let L be a DL betweenALCO andALCQIO. Then for every Boolean L-ABox, there exists an equivalent non-Boolean L@-ABox.
We remark that the translation of a Boolean L-ABox into an L@-ABox involves an exponential blowup while the converse
translation does not.
Finally, the relationship between the ‘@’ constructor/Boolean ABoxes and projective updates can easily be established by
simulating the ‘@’ constructor with a fresh role, as in the ABox F ′ in the above example.
Lemma 7. Let L be a DL between ALCO and ALCQIO. Then for every L@-ABox A, there exists an L-ABox A′ such that
M(A){r} = M
(A′){r}
where r is a role name that does not occur in A.
Proof (sketch). Let A be an L@-ABox and U an update. Construct an L-ABox A′ as follows. First convert all concepts in
A into negation normal form (NNF), in which negation occurs only in front of concept names, but not in front of complex
concepts [1]. Then replace every concept @aC with ∃r.({a}  C), r a role name not used in A. It can be proved that the
resulting ABox A′ is as required. 
3. Non-existence of updates
We present two general non-existence results for updates. First, we show that among the DLs introduced in Section 2.1,
those without nominals do not have approximate projective updates, thus no semantic updates, approximate updates, and
semantic projective updates either.
Theorem 1. Let L be a DL between ALC and ALCQI@ . Then L does not have approximate projective updates.
Proof. We exhibit an ALC-ABox and update for which we show that no approximate projective update exists in any of the
DLs listed in Theorem 1.
Let A = {a : ∃r.A, r(b,a)}, U = {¬A(b)}, and
A′ = {¬A(b), r(b,a),a : ∃r.(A unionsq {b})}.
We ﬁrst show that the ALCO-ABox A′ is a semantic update of A with U . Let I be a model of A. We have to show that IU
is a model of A′ . By deﬁnition, IU | r(b,a) and IU | ¬A(b). It remains to show that IU | a : ∃r.(A unionsq {b}). First assume
that (aI ,bI) ∈ rI . Then (aI ,bI) ∈ rIU and, therefore, IU | a : ∃r.(A unionsq {b}). Now assume (aI ,bI) /∈ rI . Then, since I |
a : ∃r.A, there exists d = bI with (aI ,d) ∈ rI and d ∈ AI . But then (aI ,d) ∈ rIU and d ∈ AIU . Again IU | a : ∃r.(A unionsq {b}).
Conversely, assume that I ′ is a model of A′ . We have to show that there exists a model I of A such that IU = I ′ . Let I
coincide with I ′ except that bI ′ ∈ AI if (aI ′ ,bI ′ ) ∈ rI ′ . Then I is a model of A and I ′ = IU , as required.
We show that there exists no ALCQI@-ABox B that is an approximate projective update of A with U regarding ALC .
It follows that for all of the DLs L in Theorem 1, there is no L-ABox that is an approximate projective update of A with U
regarding L.
Assume to the contrary that such a B exists. We start with a high-level sketch of the proof. Let ∃rn.C denote the n-fold
nesting ∃r. · · · .∃r.C , with ∃r0.C = C . We ﬁrst observe that a : ∃r.A is not an ALC-consequence of B, while a : ∃r.(Aunionsq(∃rn.	))
is an ALC-consequence of B for each n > 0. Since B is ﬁnite and formulated in ALCQI@, it cannot impose any constraints
on domain element that exceed a certain ‘distance’ (in terms of the length of shortest role paths in an interpretation)
from any individual name in B. Thus, to entail all assertions a : ∃r.(A unionsq (∃rn.	)) without entailing a : ∃r.A, B must enforce
an r-cycle. Using a careful modiﬁcation of the well-known unraveling technique [18,17] and certain guaranteed ALC-
consequences of B, we show that no such cycle is actually enforced by B.
We start with establishing some relevant (non)-entailments of B.
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(i) B | a : ∃r.A;
(ii) B | a : ∃r.(A unionsq (∃rn.	)), for all n 0;
(iii) B | a : ∃r2.	.
To prove (i), note that A′ | a : ∃r.A. We obtain that B | a : ∃r.A because B is an approximate projective update, a, r, A ∈
sig(A) and since a : ∃r.A is an ALC-assertion.
By the arguments used in the proof of (i), we know that (ii) can be proved by showing that A′ | a : ∃r.(A unionsq (∃rn.	)) for
all n > 0. Due to the fact that A′ | a : ∃r.(Aunionsq{b}), for every model I of A′ , we have that aI /∈ (∃r.A)I implies (aI ,bI) ∈ rI ,
which in turn yields a ∈ (∃rn.	)I for all n 1 since r(b,a) ∈ A′ .
To prove (iii), note that the interpretation I with I = {a,b, x}, aI = a, bI = b, rI = {(b,a), (a, x)}, and AI = {x} is a
model of A′ such that aI /∈ (∃r2.	)I . Hence A′ | a : ∃r2.	. We obtain B | a : ∃r2.	 because B is an approximate projective
update, a, r ∈ sig(A) and since a : ∃r2.	 is an ALC-assertion.
Now take a model I of B with I | a : ∃r.A. We unravel I into a new model J of B that has a forest-like shape and
still satisﬁes J | a : ∃r.A. After the unraveling, we further modify J which allows us to derive a contradiction to Point (ii)
of Claim 1.
As we want to preserve all ALCQI@-concepts in concept assertions in B, we apply an unraveling construction in which
role-predecessors are not duplicated. In detail, let J be the set of all words w = d0s0d1s1 · · · sk−1dk , k 0, such that
1. d1, . . . ,dk ∈ I ;
2. s0, . . . , sk−1 are roles (i.e. role names or their inverses);
3. there is a c ∈ NI such that d0 = cI ;
4. for all i < k, we have (di,di+1) ∈ sIi and if si = s−i+1, then di = di+2;
5. if d0 = cI0 and d1 = cI1 for c0, c1 ∈ NI , then B | s0(c0, c1).
Condition 4 is the standard approach for dealing with the presence of both number restrictions and inverse roles. Point 5
will be explained below. Deﬁne the interpretation of symbols in J as follows:
• BJ := {d0 · · ·dk ∈ J | dk ∈ BI} for all B ∈ NC;
• for all s ∈ NR ,
sJ := {(cI1 , cI2 ) ∣∣ B | s(c1, c2)}∪{
(w,wsd)
∣∣ w,wsd ∈ J }∪{(
ws−d,w
) ∣∣ w,ws−d ∈ J }.
• cJ := cI for all c ∈ NI .
Note the careful deﬁnition of sJ , where we do not include all pairs (cI1 , c
I
2 ) with (c
I
1 , c
I
2 ) ∈ sI as is often done when
unraveling models of ABoxes. Indeed, only this careful deﬁnition and Condition 5 above ensure that ABox elements are not
duplicated during unraveling, which would cause conﬂicts with number restrictions.
Claim 2. For all ALCQI@-concepts C and all w = d0 · · ·dk ∈ J , we have w ∈ CJ iff dk ∈ CI .
The proof is by induction on the structure of C . We only do the cases C = @c D and C = ( n s D) from the induction
step, leaving the remaining cases to the reader.
Let w = d0 · · ·dk ∈ J and C =@c D . Then dk ∈ (@c D)I iff cI ∈ DI iff (by IH) cJ ∈ DJ iff w ∈ (@c D)J .
Now let C = ( n s D) and w = d0 · · ·dk . Assume ﬁrst that k > 0. Let, for any e ∈ J , sI(e) = {d ∈ I | (e,d) ∈ sI},
and likewise for sJ (e). Now, using the IH and Condition 4, one can show that sI(dk) ∩ DI has the same cardinality as
sJ (w) ∩ DJ . Therefore dk ∈ ( n s D)I iff w ∈ ( n s D)J , as required.
Now assume that k = 0. Then w = d0 ∈ I ∩ J and there exists a c0 ∈ NI with cI0 = d0. If d ∈ sI(d0) and there is
a c ∈ NI with cI = d and B | s(c0, c), then (d0,d) ∈ sJ by deﬁnition of sJ . If d ∈ sI(d0) and there is no such c, then
(d0,d0sd) ∈ sJ . Thus, there exists a bijection between sI(d0) and sJ (d0) and we obtain, by applying the IH to the pairs in
this bijection, that d0 ∈ ( n s D)I iff d0 ∈ ( n s D)J , as required.
Claim 2 implies that J | a : ∃r.A as intended. Moreover, we have
Claim 3. J is a model of B.
To prove Claim 3, let ϕ ∈ B.
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1. If ϕ = C(c) for an ALCQI@-concept C , then we have I | C(c), and thus J | C(c) by Claim 2.
2. If ϕ = s(c1, c2) for a role s name, then we have B | s(c1, c2), and thus J | s(c1, c2) by deﬁnition of sJ .
3. If ϕ = ¬s(c1, c2), then we have B | s(c1, c2) (since B is consistent) and therefore J | s(c1, c2) by deﬁnition of sJ .
Thus J | ¬s(c1, c2).
This ﬁnishes the proof of Claim 3.
We deﬁne the depth d(C) of an ALCQI@-concept C as the nesting depth of number restrictions in C , with a ‘reset’
triggered by the ‘@’ constructor, i.e.,
d(B) = d(@aC) = 0
d(C  D) = d(C unionsq D) = max{d(C),d(D)}
d( n r C) = d( n r C) = d(C) + 1
d(¬C) = d(C).
The depth d(B) of B is deﬁned as max{d(C) | C(c) ∈ B}. As the next step, we further modify J by ‘cutting off’ all paths
in J that are not in B at length d(B). Thus, let J ′ = {d0 · · ·dk ∈ J | k  d(B)}, let BJ ′ and sJ ′ be the restrictions of
BJ and sJ to J ′ for all B ∈ NC and s ∈ NR , and let cJ ′ = cJ for all c ∈ NI (clearly, no cJ is dropped by the restriction
of J ). One can show by induction on the structure of C :
Claim 4. For all ALCQI@-concepts C with d(C) = i  d(B) and all w = d0 · · ·dk ∈ J with k  d(B) − i, we have w ∈ CJ iff
w ∈ CJ ′ .
Claims 3 and 4 imply that J ′ is a model of B: role assertions ϕ ∈ B are clearly not invalidated when constructing J ′
from J and concept assertions C(c) ∈ B are satisﬁed by Claim 4 and since they were satisﬁed in J .
By Point (ii) of Claim 1, to obtain a contradiction it thus remains to show that there exists an n > 0 such that
J ′ | a : ∃r.(A unionsq (∃rn.	)). Set n = d(B) + 1. First observe that J ′ | a : ∃r.A because J | a : ∃r.A. It remains to show
that J ′ | a : ∃rn+1.	. Observe that by Point (iii) of Claim 1, in B there is no r-chain of length larger than 1 starting from
a (more precisely: we have m  1 for any m with r(a, c1), r(c1, c2), . . . , r(cm−1, cm) ∈ B for some c1, . . . , cm ∈ NI). Thus,
by construction of J ′ , all r-paths d0, . . . ,dk in J ′ with d0 = aJ ′ have length k  d(B) + 1. Thus, J ′ | a : ∃rn+1.	, as
required. 
Our second non-existence result for updates states that among the DLs introduced in Section 2.1 that include nominals,
those that lack the ‘@’ constructor do not have approximate updates, thus no semantic updates either. In contrast to the
DLs considered in the previous theorem, the DLs addressed here do have projective semantic updates (thus also projective
approximate updates), see Section 4.
Theorem 2. Let L be a DL between ALCO and ALCQIO. Then L does not have approximate updates.
Proof. Let L be a DL between ALCO and ALCQIO. We construct an ALC-ABox A and update U such that there is no
ALCQIO-ABox A′ that is an approximate update of A with U regarding ALC . Let A = {a : ∃r.A}, U = {¬r(a,b)} and
A′ = {a : ∃r.A unionsq@b A,¬r(a,b)}.
It is not diﬃcult to show that the ALC@-ABox A′ is a semantic update of A with U , thus also an approximate update.
It suﬃces to show that there is no ALCQIO-ABox B with A′ | ϕ iff B | ϕ for all ALC-assertions ϕ . Assume to the
contrary that such a B exists, and choose a role name s that does not occur in A′ and B (such a role name exists since
B is ﬁnite). Now consider the interpretations I and I ′ displayed in Fig. 2. We assume that the individual names a and b
are mapped to the individuals of the same name as shown in the ﬁgure. To satisfy the UNA, we also assume that there is
an inﬁnite set of additional points that interpret the individual names distinct from a and b. On these additional points, all
concept and role names are interpreted as empty. Note that I and I ′ are models of A′ . By Point 2 of Lemma 3, they are
thus also models of B. Consider the additional interpretation I ′′ in Fig. 3. We show that I ′′ | B and I ′′ | B, thus derive a
contradiction.
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Claim 1. I ′′ | B.
Assume I ′′ | B. Deﬁne C = ¬A  ∃s.({a}  ∀r.¬A). Clearly, I ′′ | C(b). Since I ′′ | B, it follows that B | ¬C(b). Hence,
A′ | ¬C(b). This is a contradiction to the fact that A′ | ¬C(b) (note that ¬C ≡ A unionsq ∀s.({a} → ∃r.A)).
Claim 2. I ′′ | B.
To prove this claim we require an observation regarding models of ALCQIO-ABoxes. Assume that I1 and I2 are
interpretations whose domains are split into two non-empty disjoint parts, say I1 = 1,1 unionmulti 1,2 and I2 = 2,1 unionmulti 2,2
such that
(i) the interpretation of individual names is split in the same way, i.e., aI1 ∈ 1,1 iff aI2 ∈ 2,1 for all a ∈ NI;
(ii) no role name in I1 connects 1,1 and 1,2, i.e., sI1 ∩ (1,1 × 1,2) = ∅ and sI1 ∩ (1,2 × 1,1) = ∅ for all s ∈ NR;
(iii) the same for I2.
Now swap the submodel of I1 induced by 1,2 with the submodel of I2 induced by 2,2 and use I1,2 to denote the
resulting interpretation with domain 1,1 unionmulti 2,2 and I2 to denote the resulting interpretation with domain 2,1 unionmulti 1,2. It
can be proved that
(∗) for all ALCQIO-ABox assertions ϕ , we have that I1 | ϕ and I2 | ϕ iff I1,2 | ϕ and I2,1 | ϕ .
Actually, (∗) is easily veriﬁed for (possibly negated) role assertions ϕ . To establish it for concept assertions, one can prove
by induction on the structure of C that for all d ∈ i,1, i ∈ {1,2}, we have d ∈ CIi iff d ∈ CIi,i ; and for all d ∈ i,2, i ∈ {1,2},
we have d ∈ CIi iff d ∈ CIi,i (where 1= 2 and 2= 1).
To apply the above observation, we ﬁrst modify I , I ′ , and I ′′ by dropping the s-edge from b to a. Call the resulting
interpretations J , J ′ , and J ′′ , respectively. As s does not occur in B, we have J | B and J ′ | B, and to show I ′′ | B it
suﬃces to show that J ′′ | B. Observe that J ′′ is the result of swapping the submodel Jb of J induced by the domain {b}
with the submodel J ′b of J ′ induced by the domain {b}. Thus, (∗) yields that J ′′ is a model of B as required. 
4. Computing semantic updates
The main result established in this section is that adding nominals and the ‘@’ constructor to the DLs ALC , ALCI ,
ALCQ, and ALCQI suﬃces to have semantic updates. We also analyze the size of the updated ABoxes showing that our
proof incurs a blowup that is exponential in the role depth of concepts used in the original ABox and in the size of the
update, both in the case of a single update and of iterated updates. We then show that this blowup is very likely to be
unavoidable, and that the somewhat unusual extension of ALCQIO with Boolean role constructors and ‘nominal roles’
can be used to avoid the exponential blowup in the role depth of the original ABox (but not the blowup in the size of the
update).
4.1. Semantic updates in DLs with nominals and ‘@’
We provide a detailed proof that ALCQIO@ has semantic updates, thus also approximate updates (and the projective
versions of both). The proof can easily be adapted to the fragments ALCO@, ALCIO@, and ALCQO@.
As a preliminary, we observe that assertions that are already contained in the original ABox A can be dropped from the
update U .
Lemma 8. Let A, A′ be ALCQIO@-ABoxes and U an update. Then A ⇒U A′ iff A ⇒U\A A′ .
Proof. Immediate consequence of the fact that for all models I of A, we have IU = IU\A . 
Consequently, from now on we assume w.l.o.g. that A∩U = ∅ whenever A is updated with U .
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Our construction of semantic updates is an extension of the corresponding construction for propositional logic described
in [4]. We start with addressing the update of single concept assertions, where the central technical construction consists
of converting a concept C into a concept CU that can be used after the update with U to describe the set of exactly those
domain elements that have been in the extension of C before the update. The conversion proceeds by induction on the
structure of C as detailed in Fig. 4. It seems appropriate to remind the reader that r−(a,b) ∈ U is simply an abbreviation
for r(b,a) ∈ U , and likewise for negated role assertions. To get to grips with the somewhat intricate translation of number
restrictions, the reader may ﬁnd it easier to ﬁrst consider the more specialized clauses for existential restrictions and
universal restrictions, which are for convenience given in Fig. 5. As an example, consider the concept C = ∃r.A and the
update U = {¬A(b), r(b,b)}. Modulo some minor simpliﬁcations, we obtain
CU = (¬{b}  ∃r.(A unionsq {b})) unionsq ({b}  ∃r.(¬{b}  A)).
The following lemma formally states the main property of the constructed concepts CU , where we use ¬U to denote
{¬. ϕ | ϕ ∈ U} and ¬. ϕ is obtained from ¬ϕ by eliminating double negation (i.e., it denotes ψ if ϕ = ¬ψ for some ψ and ¬ϕ
otherwise). We will see later how to overcome the restriction that I has to violate all assertions in U .
Lemma 9. For all interpretations I such that I | ¬U , we have CI = (CU )IU .
Proof. Let I be an interpretation such that I | ¬U and E an ALCQIO@-concept. By induction on the structure of E , we
show that (EU )IU = EI .
• If E = A, for A a concept name, then (AU )IU is(
AI
U ∪
⋃
¬A(a)∈U
{
aI
U })∖ ⋃
A(a)∈U
{
aI
U }
=
((
AI ∪
⋃
A(a)∈U
{
aI
}∖ ⋃
¬A(a)∈U
{
aI
})∪ ⋃
¬A(a)∈U
{
aI
U })∖ ⋃
A(a)∈U
{
aI
U }
=
((
AI ∪
⋃
A(a)∈U
{
aI
}∖ ⋃
¬A(a)∈U
{
aI
})∪ ⋃
¬A(a)∈U
{
aI
})∖ ⋃
A(a)∈U
{
aI
}
= AI .
The last equality holds since, due to I | ¬U , we have AI ∩⋃A(a)∈U {aI} = ∅ and ⋃¬A(a)∈U {aI} ⊆ AI .
• The case E = {a} is immediate since I and IU interpret individual names in the same way.
H. Liu et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 2170–2197 2183• The cases E = ¬C , E = C unionsq D , E = C  D , and E =@aC are straightforward using the semantics and induction hypothesis.
• It remains to consider the cases E = (m r C) and E = (m r C). The central observation is that we have (d, e) ∈ rI
iff either
– d = aI for all a ∈ Ind(U) and (d, e) ∈ rIU ; or
– d = aI for an a ∈ Ind(U) and exactly one of the following holds:
∗ e = bI for all r(a,b) ∈ Ind(U) and (d, e) ∈ rIU ,
∗ e = bI for a b ∈ Ind(U) with ¬r(a,b) ∈ U (which implies (d, e) ∈ rI since I | ¬U and excludes the previous case
since (d, e) /∈ rIU ).
This case distinction is directly reﬂected in the translation of the concepts (m r C) and (m r C). Using this and the
induction hypothesis, it is possible to verify that (EU )IU = EI , as required. 
The concepts CU are used as a central building block for deﬁning updates of ABoxes. Let A be an ALCQIO@-ABox and
U an update. Deﬁne the ABox AU by setting
AU = {CU (a) ∣∣ C(a) ∈ A}∪{
r(a,b)
∣∣ r(a,b) ∈ A∧ ¬r(a,b) /∈ U}∪{¬r(a,b) ∣∣¬r(a,b) ∈ A∧ r(a,b) /∈ U}.
We now establish an analogue of Lemma 9, but formulated for ABoxes instead of concepts.
Lemma 10. Let A be an ABox and U an update. For every interpretation I with I | ¬U , we have I |A iff IU | AU .
Proof. “⇒” Let I | A. We show that IU | AU . Let ϕ ∈ AU . If ϕ = r(a,b) or ϕ = ¬r(a,b), then, by the deﬁnition of AU
and IU , IU | ϕ . If ϕ = EU (a) for E(a) ∈ A, Lemma 9 yields IU | EU (a).
“⇐” Let IU | AU . We show that I |A. Take ϕ ∈ A. First for the case ϕ = r(a,b). There are two subcases:
1. ¬r(a,b) ∈ U . Then r(a,b) ∈ ¬U and since I | ¬U , we obtain that I | r(a,b);
2. ¬r(a,b) /∈ U . Then r(a,b) ∈ AU , thus IU | r(a,b). We have r(a,b) /∈ U since we assume A ∩ U = ∅. By deﬁnition of
IU , this yields I | r(a,b).
The case ϕ = ¬r(a,b) is analogous to the previous one, and the case ϕ = E(a) is immediate by Lemma 9. 
Similar to the concepts CU , the construction of the ABox AU relies on the fact that the model I of A violates all
assertions in U . For a ﬁxed model I of A, we can overcome this problem by replacing CU with CU ′ , where U ′ = {ϕ ∈ U |
I | ϕ} is the update that consists of those assertions from U that are violated in I . However, the original ABox A can
have many different models I , which may give rise to different adjustments U ′ of the update U . We address this issue by
considering all subsets U ′ ⊆ U of assertions that can potentially be violated in a model of A, and then taking the disjunction
of all the resulting updated ABoxes AU ′ .
Let A be an ABox and U an update. Deﬁne the updated ABox A′ as the Boolean ABox
A′ =
∧
U ∧
∨
U ′⊆U
∧
AU ′ .
Here, we use Boolean ABox operators only as an abbreviation for the “@” constructor, see Lemma 6.
Lemma 11. A ⇒U A′ .
Proof. We prove that both inclusions of M(A′) = {IU | I ∈ M(A)} hold.
“⊇” Let I | A. We have to show that IU | A′ . By deﬁnition of IU , IU | U . Deﬁne a subset U ′ ⊆ U as U ′ = {ϕ ∈ U |
I | ϕ}. By Lemma 10, we have IU ′ | AU ′ . Moreover, using the deﬁnition of U ′ and IU ′ , it can be veriﬁed that IU ′ = IU ,
thus IU | AU ′ which yields IU | A′ .
“⊆” Let I ′ | A′ . We need to show that there exists an interpretation I such that I | A and I ′ = IU . Since I ′ | A′ ,
there is a U ′ ⊆ U such that I ′ | AU ′ . Let I = (I ′)¬(U ′) , i.e., we undo all the modiﬁcations in the selected adjustment U ′ .
Then I ′ = IU ′ = IU . Moreover, Lemma 10 yields I |A. 
The presented construction of semantic updates can be adapted to the DLs ALCO@, ALCIO@, and ALCQO@. For the
former two, we have to treat existential and universal restrictions in the CU translation rather than number restrictions.
The corresponding clauses are shown in Fig. 5. The lemmas proved above for ALCQIO@ are then easily adapted.
Theorem 3. The DLs ALCO@ , ALCIO@ , ALCQO@ , and ALCQIO@ have semantic updates.
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4.2. The size of semantic updates
We show that the above construction yields semantic updates whose size is at most exponential in the size of the role
depth of the original ABox and the size of the update. If the role depth of the original ABoxes is ﬁxed, then the size of the
update is polynomial in the size of the original ABox and exponential in the size of the update.
The length of a concept C , denoted by |C |, is the number of symbols needed to write C . Numbers inside number re-
strictions can be coded in unary or in binary, which yields |( n r C)| ∈ O(n) and |( n r C)| ∈ O(logn), respectively.
Since all our results hold independently of the chosen coding scheme, we from now on assume binary coding. The role
depth of a concept C , denoted by rd(C), is the nesting depth of number restrictions in C , i.e., rd(A) = 0, rd(¬C) = rd(C),
rd(C  D) = rd(C unionsq D) = max(rd(C), rd(D)) + 1, and rd( n r C) = rd( n r C) = rd(C) + 1.
The size of an ABox assertion C(a) is |C |, the size of r(a,b) and ¬r(a,b) is 1. The size of an ABox A, denoted by |A|, is
the sum of the sizes of all assertions in A. The role depth of an ABox A, denotes by rd(A), is max{rd(C) | C(a) ∈A}.
A close inspection of our construction of semantic updates reveals the following result.
Theorem 4. Let L ∈ {ALCO@,ALCIO@,ALCQO@,ALCQIO@}. Then for every L-ABox A and update U , the semantic update
A′ of A with U computed by our algorithm satisﬁes∣∣A′∣∣ |A| · 2O(log(|A|)·|U |·rd(A)) · 22|U |
and can be computed in time polynomial in |A′|.
Proof. By inspection of the construction given in Section 4.1. We distinguish two cases. First, assume that rd(A) = 0. Then
the size of each concept CU is |C | · |U | and each ABox AU ′ is of size at most |A| · |U |. The semantic update A′ comprises
2|U | such ABoxes AU ′ plus the update U , thus the overall size is clearly dominated by the given expression. Now assume
that rd(A) > 0. View CU as a syntax tree in which all purely Boolean subtrees are collapsed into a single node, where
a subtree is Boolean if none of its nodes is labeled with the ‘@’ constructor or a number restriction. By construction, it
follows that CU has outdegree at most |C | · 2O(|U |) and depth at most rd(C). Since every collapsed node represents at most
|C | · 2O(|U |) syntax tree nodes, the size of CU is bounded by 2O(log(|C |)·|U |·rd(C)) . Analogously, the size of each ABox AU ′ is
bounded by |A| · 2O(log(|A|)·|U |·rd(A)) . The semantic update A′ comprises 2|U | such ABoxes AU ′ plus the update U , thus the
overall size is again dominated by the given expression. 
Note that the bound stated in Theorem 4 is polynomial in the overall size of the original ABox (which is potentially
large), and exponential only in the role depth of the original ABox and the size of the update, which are typically small. In
particular, if the input ABox does not comprise any number restrictions (and neither existential and universal restrictions),
then the size of updated ABoxes is exactly as in propositional logic [9].
In many applications, the state of affairs evolves continuously which makes it necessary to update the ABox over and
over again. It is then clearly important that the exponential blowups of the repeated updates do not add up, which would
result in a non-elementary growth of the produced semantic updates. The following theorem shows that this is indeed not
the case.
Theorem 5. Let L ∈ {ALCO@,ALCIO@,ALCQO@,ALCQIO@}, A0, . . . ,An L-ABoxes, U1, . . . ,Un updates, and Ai+1 the se-
mantic update of Ai with Ui+1 computed by our algorithm, for 0 i < n. Then
|An| |A0| · 2O(log(|A0|)·(|U1|+···+|Un|)·rd(A0)) · 22(|U1|+···+|Un|).
Proof. The argument is analogous to the proof of Theorem 4. In particular, viewing a concept ((CU1 )···)Un as a syntax tree
with collapsed nodes as in that proof, it is not hard to see that the outdegree is at most |C | ·2O(|U1|+···+|Un |) and the depth is
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CU is bounded by 2O(log(|C |)·(|U1|+···+|Un |)·rd(C)) . Analogously, the size of each ABox ((AU
′
1
0 )
···)U ′n , with U ′1 ⊆ U1, . . . ,U ′n ⊆ Un ,
is bounded by |A0| · 2O(log(|A0|)·(|U1|+···+|Un |)·rd(A0)) . The semantic update An is a Boolean combination of 2|U1|+···+|Un| such
ABoxes and 2|U2|+···+|Un| ABoxes of the form ((UU
′
i+1
i )
···)U ′n . The size of each of the latter ABoxes is bounded by |U1| · · · · · |Un|.
In summary, the size of An is thus bounded by the expression given in Theorem 5. 
4.3. A lower bound for the size of semantic updates
We show that, in ALCQIO@ and its fragments, an exponential blowup of semantic updates cannot be avoided unless
NP∩ co-NP⊆ NC1,
where NC1 is the class of problems that is solvable by a family of circuits of polynomial size and logarithmic depth. We
work with the non-uniform version of NC1 here, i.e., we do not demand that the circuit for a given input length can be
computed within certain resource bounds (or at all!). The stated inclusion is widely believed to not hold. It is intimately
related to the important open question whether every problem that is eﬃciently solvable can be effectively parallelized,
i.e., whether PTimeis a subset of uniform NC1, which is also not believed to be the case. In particular, there are reasons to
assume that (non)-uniformity is irrelevant for inclusions of this sort, see e.g. [19].
We obtain our result by relating semantic updates to Craig interpolants in propositional logic, which allows us to trans-
fer known lower bounds for the size of such interpolants, see e.g. [20–22]. In what follows, we will deliberately confuse
propositional formulas and concepts that use only the Boolean constructors ¬, , and unionsq. We use sig(ϕ) to denote the set
of propositional letters that occur in the propositional formula ϕ , and sig(A) to denote the concept and role names that
occur in the ABox A. Recall that, given two propositional formulas ϕ and ψ with ϕ | ψ , a Craig interpolant of ϕ and ψ is a
formula ϑ with ϕ | ϑ | ψ and such that sig(ϑ) ⊆ sig(ϕ)∩ sig(ψ). For a propositional formula ϕ and a set of propositional
letters S , we use ϕ[S/	] to denote the result of replacing each letter from S in ϕ with 	 (i.e., logical truth).
Lemma 12. Let ϕ , ψ , and ϑ be propositional formulas with ϕ | ψ . If A = {ϕ(a)}, U = {p(a) | p ∈ sig(ϕ) \ sig(ψ)}, and A ⇒U
{ϑ(a)}, then ϑ[S/	] is a Craig interpolant of ϕ and ψ where S = sig(ϑ) \ (sig(ϕ) ∩ sig(ψ)).
Proof. Clearly, ϑ[S/	] contains only propositional letters from sig(ϕ) ∩ sig(ψ) as required. It thus remains to show that
ϕ | ϑ[S/	] | ψ . We start with noting that
(∗) ϑ[S/	] ≡ ϑ[sig(U)/	].
To see (∗), note that (S \ sig(U)) ∩ (sig(A) ∪ sig(U)) = ∅, and thus A ⇒U {ϑ(a)} implies that whenever I is a model
of ϑ and I and J differ only in the interpretation of symbols from S \ sig(U), then J is also a model of ϑ . It follows
that ϑ[sig(U)/	] has the same property. Thus, replacing all symbols from S \ sig(U) in ϑ[sig(U)/	] with 	, which yields
ϑ[S/	], is an equivalence preserving operation.
We now show that ϕ | ϑ[S/	] | ψ .
• ϕ | ϑ[S/	].
Let I | ϕ(a). Then IU | ϑ(a). Moreover, IU | p(a) for all p ∈ sig(U). It follows that IU | ϑ[sig(U)/	](a), thus
IU | ϑ[S/	](a) by (∗). Since I and IU agree on the interpretation of all propositional letters from sig(ϕ)∩ sig(ψ), we
get I | ϑ[S/	](a).
• ϑ[S/	] | ψ .
Let J | ϑ[S/	](a). By (∗), J | ϑ[sig(U)/	](a). Let J ′ be obtained from J by interpreting all p ∈ sig(U) as true, i.e.,
pJ ′ = J ′ . Clearly, J ′ | ϑ(a). Thus there is a model I of A with IU = J ′ . Since I | ϕ(a), we have I | ψ(a). As I ,
J ′ , and J agree on the interpretation of all propositional letters from sig(ψ), we get J | ψ(a). 
As a side remark, we note that the formula ϑ[S/	] in Lemma 12 is even a uniform interpolant for ϕ and sig(ψ): for
any ψ ′ with sig(ψ ′) ∩ sig(ϕ) ⊆ sig(ψ) and ϕ | ψ ′ we have ϑ[S/	] | ψ ′ .
The semantic update {ϑ(a)} considered in Lemma 12 is of a rather particular form. To establish a lower bound for the
size of semantic updates in ALCQIO@, we observe that one cannot express ABoxes of the form {ϑ(a)}, ϑ a propositional
formula, more succinctly in ALCQIO@. The following lemma states this fact even for ﬁrst-order logic (with equality), of
which ALCQIO@ is a fragment when concept names are confused with unary predicates and role names with binary
predicates [23]. The lemma can easily be proved by standard manipulations of FO formulas; details are left to the reader.
Lemma 13. Let ϑ(a) be an ABox assertion, where ϑ is a propositional formula, and let ϕ be a ﬁrst-order sentence that is equivalent to
ϑ(a). Then there exists a propositional formula ϑ ′ that is equivalent to ϑ such that |ϑ ′(a)| |ϕ|.
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NP∩ co-NP⊆ NC1, Lemmas 12 and 13 yield the desired result.
Theorem 6. If there exists a polynomial p such that, for all propositional ABoxes A and updates U , there exists an ALCQIO@-ABox
A′ such that A ⇒U A′ and |A′| p(|A| · |U |), then NP∩ co-NP⊆ NC1 .
Proof. Assume there is a polynomial p as stated in Theorem 6. We show that then p2 bounds the size of Craig interpolants
in propositional logic, which implies NP ∩ co-NP ⊆ NC1 as observed in [20]. Let ϕ and ψ be propositional formulas and
take the ABox A = {ϕ(a)} and update U = {p(a) | p ∈ sig(ϕ) \ sig(ψ)}. Then there is an ALCQIO@-ABox A′ with A ⇒U
A′ and |A′|  p(|A| · |U |). By our algorithm computing semantic updates, there is a propositional formula ϑ such that
A ⇒U {ϑ(a)}. By Lemma 1, A′ and {ϑ(a)} are logically equivalent. By Lemma 13, A′ is logically equivalent to an ABox
A′′ = {ϑ ′(a)} with ϑ ′ a propositional formula and |A′′| |A′|. Finally, by Lemma 12 this implies that ϑ ′[S/	], S = sig(ϑ ′) \
(sig(ϕ) ∩ sig(ψ)), is a Craig interpolant of ϕ and ψ , whose size is bounded by p(|ϕ|2) (and independent of |ψ |). 
As shown in [22], it is possible to replace the complexity-theoretic proviso in Theorem 6 with UP ⊆ P/poly , where UP is
the class of problems in NPaccepted by a non-deterministic Turing machine with unique accepting paths and P/poly is the
non-uniform version of PTime. Just like the statement used in Theorem 6, it is strongly believed that UP ⊆ P/poly does not
hold.
We note that the result stated as Theorem 6 is closely related to a similar result proved by Cadoli et al. which states that
for semantic updates of propositional theories, an exponential blowup cannot be avoided unless the polynomial hierarchy
collapses [9]. However, Cadoli et al.’s technique does not appear to work with the restricted form of updates U considered
in this paper, where we allow only literals but no compound concepts/formulas.
4.4. Smaller updates in ALCQIO+
An inspection of the construction of semantic updates presented in Section 4.1 reveals that, in the case where the update
U contains only concept assertions but no role assertions, computing the concepts CU becomes a lot simpler: we only have
to replace every concept name A in C with(
A unionsq
⊔
¬A(a)∈U
{a}
)
 ¬
( ⊔
A(a)∈U
{a}
)
.
In particular, the resulting semantic update AU is then only exponential in |U |, but no longer in the role depth of A.
To understand why such a simple rewriting is not possible when roles are updated, note that the above construction
makes essential use of nominals, the ‘@’ constructor, and the Boolean concept constructors. In standard DLs, none of these
constructors is available for roles: we can neither construct the union of roles, nor their complement, nor a “nominal
role” {(a,b)} with a and b individual names. In this section, we consider a DL that comprises such slightly unusual role
constructors and show that it admits simple semantic updates of the above form also in the case when the update comprises
role assertions.
Denote by ALCQIO+ the DL that extends ALCQIO@ by means of the role constructors ∪ (role union), \ (set-theoretic
difference of roles), and {(a,b)} (nominal roles). In this language, compound roles are constructed by starting from role
names and nominal roles, and then applying ∪, \, and the inverse role constructor ·− . The semantics of compound roles is
as expected:
• {(a,b)}I = {(aI ,bI)}, for all a,b ∈ NI;
• (r1 ∪ r2)I = rI1 ∪ rI2 ;
• (r1 \ r2)I = rI1 \ rI2 .
We note that ALCQIO+ is of almost the same expressive power as C2, the two-variable fragment of ﬁrst-order logic with
counting quantiﬁers [24]. In particular, ALCQIO+-ABoxes can easily be translated into formulas of C2. The following is
the main result of this section.
Theorem 7. There is a polynomial p such that, for every ALCQIO+-ABox A and every update U , there is an ALCQIO+-ABox A′
such that
1. A ⇒U A′;
2. |A′| |A| · 2p(|U |);
3. A′ can be computed in time p(|A′|).
Proof. We modify the construction from Section 4.1. The construction of the concepts CU is now as follows: replace every
concept name A in C with
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A unionsq
⊔
¬A(a)∈U
{a}
)
 ¬
( ⊔
A(a)∈U
{a}
)
and every role name r in C with(
r ∪
⋃
¬r(a,b)∈U
{
(a,b)
})∖ ⋃
r(a,b)∈U
{
(a,b)
}
.
The concepts CU are thus of size polynomial in |A| · |U |. The ABox A′ can then be constructed in the same way as in
Section 4.1. 
Clearly, Theorem 7 is independent of the coding of numbers, and iterated updates retain the same size bound, with |U |
replaced by |U1|+ · · ·+ |Un|. An alternative to working with a description logic such as ALCQIO+ is to work directly with
the two-variable fragment with counting C2. Then, a result analogous to Theorem 7 is easily obtained.
5. Computing projective updates
We consider projective updates and show that they are more well-behaved than semantic ones: ﬁrst, projective updates
are enjoyed by all DLs between ALCO and ALCQIO@, including those that do not comprise the ‘@’ constructor; and
second, projective updates can be constructed in polynomial time and without an exponential blowup. We prove this in
detail for ALCQIO@ using an approach that can easily be adapted to all DLs between ALCO@ and ALCQIO@. These
results then transfer to the corresponding DLs without the ‘@’ constructor thanks to Lemma 7.
Let A be an ALCQIO@-ABox and U an update. We show how to construct an ALCQIO@-ABox A′ such that A ⇒pUA′ . Let sub(A) denote the closure under subconcepts of {C | C(a) ∈ A}. The general approach to constructing A′ shares a
lot of similarity with the construction of semantic updates in Section 4.1. However, we need some subtle technical tricks to
avoid the exponential blowups that occur there, namely (i) during the construction of the concepts CU and (ii) due to the
ﬁnal disjunction over all U ′ ⊆ U . The central idea to overcome both blowups is to use fresh concept names XC and fresh
role names ρr to explicitly reconstruct in A′ the extension of all concepts C ∈ sub(A) and all roles name r ∈ role(A) before
the update. This allows us to eliminate blowup (i) because the concept names XC enable ‘structure sharing’, thus addressing
the multiple occurrences of concepts CU on the right-hand side of the clauses in Fig. 4; moreover, the role names ρr help to
avoid the exponential case distinction ‘for all S ⊆ {b | ¬r(a,b) ∈ U}’ in the clauses for number restrictions. The use of the XC
and ρr also allows us to eliminate blowup (ii) as the case distinction ‘for all U ′ ⊆ U ’ can be replaced with some ‘freedom’
that we will leave in the interpretation of the XC and ρr , and that intuitively corresponds to an existential quantiﬁcation
over all U ′ ⊆ U . More details are given below after the construction of A′ . In what follows, we use ρr− to denote (ρr)− .
The projective update A′ will be the union of four ABoxes. First, A′ contains the update U . Second, we set up an ABox
Ainit that stores the original ABox A using the concept names XC for C and role names ρr for r:
Ainit =
{
XC (a)
∣∣ C(a) ∈ A}∪{
ρr(a,b)
∣∣ a,b ∈ Ind(U), r(a,b) ∈ A}∪{¬ρr(a,b) ∣∣ a,b ∈ Ind(U),¬r(a,b) ∈ A}∪{
r(a,b)
∣∣ {a,b} Ind(U), r(a,b) ∈ A}∪{¬r(a,b) ∣∣ {a,b} Ind(U),¬r(a,b) ∈ A}.
The remaining two ABoxes establish the relationship between ρr and r and XC and C . First, we state that the interpretation
of ρr coincides with r for all ABox individuals that are not affected by the update U :
Ar =
{(∃ρr .{b} ↔ ∃r.{b})(a) ∣∣ a,b ∈ Ind(U), r ∈ role(A), r(a,b) /∈ U,¬r(a,b) /∈ U}.
Second, we ensure that each concept name XC , C ∈ sub(A) represents the extension of C before the update (and thus
behaves like the concept CU ) by taking the conjunction Cbi of all concepts in Fig. 6, i.e., one biimplication for each
fresh concept name XC , C ∈ sub(A). Note that the biimplication for XA , A ∈ NC , which is given in the ﬁrst line, states
that XA is interpreted like A except on the individuals where an update of A occurred. In particular, if A /∈ sub(U), then
(
⊔A(a)∈U or¬A(a)∈U¬{a}) is equivalent to 	 and, therefore, the concept in the ﬁrst line is equivalent to XA ↔ A. On those
individuals where an update occurred, the only constraints for XA are those given in Ainit . It can thus be veriﬁed that the
possible extensions of XA are precisely the possible extensions of A before the update (in general, there is more than one
possibility, e.g. if A(a) ∈ U and {A(a),¬A(a)} ∩ A = ∅). The fresh roles ρr can be understood similarly, with the ABox Ar
playing the role of the biimplications for XA . However, there is also one major difference: since we cannot express that ρr
has the same extension as r on non-ABox domain elements, we use r instead of ρr when dealing with such elements. This
is reﬂected by the use of both r and ρr in the biimplications for number restrictions.
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Unfortunately, ALCQIO@ also lacks the expressive power to enforce that Cbi is satisﬁed by all domain elements. We
thus resort to enforcing that Cbi is satisﬁed by all ‘relevant’ domain elements, i.e., by all domain elements that can be
reached from an ABox individual in A by a sequence of roles that occurs in some concept C ∈ sub(A). Formally, we induc-
tively associate with each concept C ∈ sub(A) a set path(C) of words r1 . . . rn ∈ NR∗ as follows, where ε denotes the empty
sequence:
path
({a})= {ε}
path(A) = {ε}
path(C1  C2) = path(C1) ∪ path(C2)
path(C1 unionsq C2) = path(C1) ∪ path(C2)
path(¬C) = path(C)
path(@aC) = path(C)
path(m r C) = {rw ∣∣ w ∈ path(C)}∪ {ε}
path(m r C) = {rw ∣∣ w ∈ path(C)}∪ {ε}.
Let path(A) =⋃{path(C) | C ∈ sub(A)}. Now choose a fresh individual name a∗ and a fresh role name u, and set
Arel =
{∀uw.Cbi(a∗) ∣∣ w ∈ path(A)}∪ {u(a∗,b) | b ∈ Ind(A)},
where ∀w.C abbreviates ∀r1. · · · .∀rn.C when w = r1 · · · rn . Finally, let
A′ = Ainit ∪Ar ∪Arel ∪ U .
Before proving that A ⇒pU A′ , we give an example that also illustrates our approach to avoiding the exponential blowup
of type (ii) described above. Let A = {a : ∃r.A,a : ∃s.¬A} and U = {A(a1),¬A(a2)} and note that, due to the UNA and since
r does not occur in U , we can simplify a : (∃r.A)U to the equivalent assertion a : ∃r.AU . Thus, the conjunction of U with the
following assertion is a simpliﬁed version of the semantic update computed by our algorithm:
a : ∃r.A ∧ a : ∃s.¬A
∨ a : ∃r.(A  ¬{a1})∧ a : ∃s.¬(A  ¬{a1})
∨ a : ∃r.(A unionsq {a2})∧ a : ∃s.¬(A unionsq {a2})
∨ a : ∃r.((A unionsq {a2})  ¬{a1})∧ a : ∃s.¬((A unionsq {a2})  ¬{a1}).
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∧AU ′ for U ′ ⊆ U . Intuitively, this
disjunction reﬂects the fact that each of A(a1) and ¬A(a2) might or might not be satisﬁed already before the update. The
projective update is the union of U and the following ABoxes (where we have simpliﬁed Cbi by taking into account that for
any role r /∈ sig(U), the right-hand side of the biimplication for ∃r.C is equivalent to ∃r.XC ):
Ainit = {a : X∃r.A,a : X∃s.¬A}
Ar = ∅
Arel =
{
u
(
a∗,a
)}∪ {∀u.Cbi(a∗),∀u.∀r.Cbi(a∗),∀u.∀s.Cbi(a∗)} where
Cbi = (X∃r.A ↔ ∃r.XA)  (X∃s.¬A ↔ ∃s.X¬A)  (X¬A ↔ ¬XA) 
((¬{a1}  ¬{a2})→ (XA ↔ A)).
Observe that the interpretation of X∃r.A and X∃s.¬A on a1 and a2 is not constrained using a case distinction but by demand-
ing that Ainit is satisﬁed.
Lemma 14. A ⇒pU A′ .
Proof. Assume ﬁrst that I ∈ M(A)U . We have to show that there exists a model I ′ of A′ that coincides with I for all
symbols distinct from u, a∗ , the role names ρr , r ∈ role(A), and the concept names XC , C ∈ sub(A). By deﬁnition, there
exists a model I0 of A such that I = IU0 . Now deﬁne I ′ in the same way as I but extended by setting(
a∗
)I′ := d0, for some d0 ∈ I ,
uI
′ := {(d0,bI) ∣∣ b ∈ Ind(A)},
ρI
′
r := rI0 , for r ∈ role(A),
XI
′
C := CI0 , for C ∈ sub(A).
It is easily veriﬁed that I ′ is a model of A′ and, therefore, as required.
Conversely, assume that I is a model of A′ . We construct a model I0 of A such that I = IU0 . Deﬁne I0 as follows: for
all concept names A /∈ sub(A) ∩ sub(U), set AI0 = AI . For all concept names A ∈ sub(A) ∩ sub(U), set d ∈ AI0 iff:
1. d ∈ AI and d /∈ {aI | a ∈ Ind(U)}; or
2. d ∈ XIA and d ∈ {aI | a ∈ Ind(U)}.
Similarly, for all role names r /∈ role(A)∩ role(U), set rI0 = rI . For all role names r ∈ roles(A)∩ role(U), set (d1,d2) ∈ rI0 iff:
1. (d1,d2) ∈ rI and {d1,d2} {aI | a ∈ Ind(U)}; or
2. (d1,d2) ∈ ρIr and {d1,d2} ⊆ {aI | a ∈ Ind(U)}.
We show that I0 is a model of A and I = IU0 .
Claim 1. For all C(a) ∈ A, I0 | C(a) iff I | XC (a).
We show that for all C ∈ sub(A), subconcepts E of C , and words w and d ∈ I such that (bI ,d) ∈ wI for some
b ∈ Ind(A) and {wv | v ∈ path(E)} ⊆ path(C), we have
d ∈ EI0 iff d ∈ XIE .
Claim 1 then follows immediately by taking w = ε. The proof is by structural induction on E and uses Arel . We consider
the cases where E is a concept name or of the form (m r F ). First let E = A for a concept name A. Since path(A) = {ε},
we have to consider all d with (bI ,d) ∈ wI for some b ∈ Ind(A) and w ∈ path(C). Assume d is given. If d /∈ {aI | a ∈ Ind(U)},
then d ∈ XIA iff d ∈ AI (ﬁrst biimplication in Fig. 6) iff d ∈ AI0 , by deﬁnition of AI0 . Otherwise, if d ∈ {aI | a ∈ Ind(U)}, then
d ∈ AI0 iff d ∈ XIA , again by deﬁnition of AI0 .
Now consider the case E = (m r F ). Assume (bI ,d) ∈ wI for some b ∈ Ind(A) and wv ∈ path(C) for all v ∈ path(E).
Then wrv ∈ path(C) for all v ∈ path(F ).
We distinguish the following cases:
• d /∈ {aI | a ∈ Ind(U)}. By the biimplication for X(m r F ) in Fig. 6, we have that d ∈ XIE iff d ∈ (m r XF )I . For all x
we have that (d, x) ∈ rI iff (d, x) ∈ rI0 . Moreover, for all x such that (d, x) ∈ rI , we have that (bI , x) ∈ (wr)I . By IH, it
holds that x ∈ FI0 iff x ∈ XI . Thus we obtain d ∈ XI iff d ∈ (m r F )I0 = EI0 .F E
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m1+m2 =m and m2  |Ind(U)| we have both d ∈ (m1 r ⊔b∈Ind(U)¬{b} XF )I and d ∈ (m2 ρr ⊔b∈Ind(U){b} XF )I .
Then d ∈ ( m1 r ⊔b∈Ind(U)¬{b}  XF )I iff d ∈ ( m1 r ⊔b∈Ind(U)¬{b}  F )I0 can be proved analogously to the
previous case. Note that if x = cI for some c ∈ Ind(A), then (d, x) ∈ rI0 iff (d, x) ∈ ρIr . Moreover, by IH, cI ∈ FI0
iff cI ∈ XIF . Thus d ∈ ( m2 ρr
⊔
b∈Ind(U){b}  XF )I iff d ∈ ( m2 r
⊔
b∈Ind(U){b}  F )I0 . Summing up the previous
equivalences, we obtain that d ∈ XIE iff d ∈ (m r F )I0 = EI0 , as required.
From Claim 1, the condition that I is a model of Ainit , and the deﬁnition of rI0 , we obtain that I0 is a model of A.
It remains to show that I = IU0 . First, interpretations of concept and role names which do not appear in U are identical
in I0 and I . Second, I and I0 interpret all role and concept names which appear in U in the same way on the part of
the domain I unaffected by the update U : for concept names A, the deﬁnition of AI0 , and the ﬁrst biimplication in
Fig. 6 imply that for all x ∈ I \ {aI | A(a) ∈ U or ¬A(a) ∈ U} it holds that x ∈ AI0 iff x ∈ AI . Similarly, for role names r,
the deﬁnition of rI0 and I | Ar imply that for all (x, y) ∈ (I × I) \ {(aI ,bI) | r(a,b) ∈ U or ¬r(a,b) ∈ U} it holds that
(x, y) ∈ rI0 iff (x, y) ∈ rI . Thus, since I | U , we obtain that I = IU0 . 
We now analyze the size of A′ in terms of the size of A and U . Obviously, |Ainit|  |A| and |Ar| = O(|U |3). Since
|Cbi| = O(|U |3 · |A|) (independently from the coding of numbers inside number restrictions) and |path(A)| |A|2, we obtain
that |Arel| =O(|A|3 · |U |3). Summing up, we obtain |A′| =O(|U |3 · |A|3).
Together with Lemma 7, we thus obtain the following result, which in particular implies that all DLs between ALCO
and ALCQIO@ have projective updates. It is independent of the coding of numbers inside number restrictions.
Theorem 8. Let L be a DL between ALCO and ALCQIO@ . Then there is a polynomial p such that, for every L-ABox A and every
update U , there is an L-ABox A′ such that
1. A ⇒pU A′;
2. |A′| p(|A| · |U |);
3. A′ can be computed in time p(|A′|).
In a context where also TBoxes are available, it might be more appropriate to store the conjuncts of Cbi in a TBox rather
than in A′ . In this way, we do not need to introduce the new individual a∗ and can avoid the paths of role names altogether.
It can be seen that an acyclic TBox suﬃces, please see [15] to get a more concrete idea.
We close this section with a brief discussion of iterated updates in the projective case. To start with, we note that
it is possible to repeatedly compute projective updates using the presented construction by simply treating fresh symbols
introduced by earlier updates as ‘normal’ symbols during all subsequent updates. These updates are then even stronger than
necessary since later updates preserve the meaning of fresh symbols introduced by earlier updates. Unfortunately, it is easy
to see that the projective update A′ that is obtained by starting with an ABox A and then consecutively applying updates
U1, . . . ,Un using our construction is exponential in n. In particular, if A = A0, . . . ,An = A′ are the generated projective
updates, then it is easy to see that each Ai contains ki · |sub(A)| concept names XC , for some constant k. Despite this
problem, it is still straightforward to carry out repeated updates without ever obtaining an ABox of exponential size. The
simple workaround is to keep the original ABox A in memory and then to repeatedly update the updates Ui instead of the
projective updates Ai . More precisely, deﬁne a cumulative update
Ûi = Ui ∪ (Ûi−1 \ ¬Ui+1)
for 1  i  n. When processing the stream of updates U1, . . . ,Un , only keep A and the latest cumulative update Ûi in
memory. At any time, the ‘current’ projective update is obtained by applying our construction to A and Ûi . Clearly, all
projective updates obtained in this way are of size polynomial in |A| and |U1| + · · · + |Un|.
6. Conditional updates and reasoning about action
Up to now, we have considered updates U that are unconditional in the sense that all assertions in U are necessarily
true after the update, not subject to any conditions. In some applications, though, it is more useful to allow conditional
updates that are able to express statements such as ‘A(a) is true after the update if C(b) was true before’. In particular,
such a generalization is important for reasoning about actions, which has recently been studied in a DL context [12] and
where ABox updates play a crucial role for implementing the reasoning pattern of ‘progression’, as opposed to ‘regression’
approaches [7]. In this section, we introduce conditional updates and show that all results that we have proved for uncon-
ditional updates, both semantic and projective, are also true for the corresponding version of conditional updates. As an
application, we put conditional updates to work for reasoning about action, using the progression approach to reprove the
optimal upper complexity bounds for the projection problem of DL actions that were ﬁrst established using regression in
[12]. The latter results will be based on projective updates.
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precondition ϕ is an L-ABox assertion and the postcondition ψ is, as in the unconditional case, an assertion of one of the
forms
A(a), ¬A(a), r(a,b), ¬r(a,b).
Intuitively, ϕ/ψ ∈ U means that if ϕ holds before the update, then ψ holds after it. Analogously to the case of unconditional
updates, we require a consistency condition: if ϕ/ψ and ϕ′/¬ψ are both in U , then the ABox {ϕ,ϕ′} has to be inconsistent.
We now adapt the notion of an interpretation update to the case of conditional updates.
Deﬁnition 5 (Conditional interpretation update). Let U be a conditional update and I an interpretation. Deﬁne an interpreta-
tion IU by setting for all individual names a, concept names A, and role names r:
I
U = I
aI
U = aI
AI
U = (AI ∪ {aI ∣∣ ϕ/A(a) ∈ U and I | ϕ})∖{aI ∣∣ ϕ/¬A(a) ∈ U and I | ϕ}
rI
U = (rI ∪ {(aI ,bI) ∣∣ ϕ/r(a,b) ∈ U and I | ϕ})∖{(aI ,bI) ∣∣ ϕ/¬r(a,b) ∈ U and I | ϕ}.
IU is called the result of updating I with U .
The conditional versions of semantic and projective updates are deﬁned in the same way as for unconditional updates.
We repeat the deﬁnition for the reader’s convenience.
Deﬁnition 6 (Semantic (projective) conditional updates). Let A be an ALCQIO@-ABox and U a conditional update.
An ALCQIO@-ABox A′ is a semantic update of A with U , in symbols A ⇒U A′ , if
M
(A′)= {IU ∣∣ I ∈ M(A)}.
A description logic L has semantic conditional updates if for every L-ABox A and conditional L-update U , there is an L-ABox
A′ with A ⇒U A′ .
An ALCQIO@-ABox A′ is a projective update of A with U , in symbols A ⇒pU A, if
M
(A′)Fr(A′) = {IU ∣∣ I ∈ M(A)}Fr(A′),
where Fr(A′) = sig(A′) \ (sig(A) ∪ sig(U)) is the set of fresh symbols in A′ . A description logic L has semantic projective
conditional updates if for every L-ABox A and conditional L-update U , there is an L-ABox A′ with A ⇒pU A′ .
Note that conditional updates generalize unconditional ones since assertions ψ of unconditional updates can be ex-
pressed as 	(a)/ψ , with a an arbitrary individual name. It follows that all non-existence results that we have proved in
Section 3 for unconditional updates hold for conditional updates as well. Regarding results about the existence of updates,
our ﬁrst aim is to generalize Theorems 3, 4, and 8 from the unconditional to the conditional case. We leave the straightfor-
ward generalization of other results such as Theorem 7 to the interested reader. We start with extending Theorem 3.
Theorem 9. ALCO@ , ALCIO@ , ALCQO@ , and ALCQIO@ have semantic conditional updates.
Proof. Let A be an ABox formulated in one of the DLs in Theorem 9 and U a conditional update. The assertions that occur
on the left-hand side of update statements in U is lhs(U) = {ϕ | ϕ/ψ ∈ U}. Each D ⊆ lhs(U) corresponds to one possible
choice of preconditions that are true before the update. For each such D, the ABox
PreD = D ∪
{¬ϕ ∣∣ ϕ ∈ lhs(U) \D}
identiﬁes the models that realize the choice D and
PostD = {ψ | ϕ/ψ ∈ U,ϕ ∈ D}
is the unconditional update that has to be executed in those models. By Lemma 11, we have
(A∪ PreD) ⇒PostD AD
where
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∧
PostD ∧
∨
U ′⊆PostD
∧
(A∪ PreD)U ′ .
By the semantics of ABox updates, it follows that A ⇒U A′ where
A′ =
∨
D⊆lhs(U)
(∧
PostD ∧
∨
U ′⊆PostD
∧
(A∪ PreD)U ′
)
. 
It follows from the construction of A′ in the above proof that the upper bound on the size of semantic updates given in
Theorem 4 still applies in the conditional case. We now consider projective conditional updates, generalizing Theorem 8.
Theorem 10. Let L be a DL between ALCO and ALCQIO@ . Then there is a polynomial p such that, for every L-ABox A and every
conditional L-update U , there is an L-ABox A′ such that
1. A ⇒pU A′;
2. |A′| p(|A| · |U |);
3. A′ can be computed in time p(|A′|).
Proof (sketch). Assume that A is an ALCQIO@-ABox and U a conditional ALCQIO@-update. To deﬁne a projective
update, introduce fresh concept names XA for all A ∈ sub(A ∪ lhs(U)) and fresh role names ρr for all r ∈ role(A ∪ lhs(U)).
The additional names for concepts and roles in lhs(U) are used to represent the preconditions of U that hold in the original
interpretation. The component Ainit is deﬁned in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 8 by setting
Ainit =
{
XC (a)
∣∣ C(a) ∈ A}∪{
ρr(a,b)
∣∣ r(a,b) ∈ A}∪{¬ρr(a,b) ∣∣¬r(a,b) ∈ A}.
Set
Ar =
{(∃ρr .{b} ↔ ∃r.{b})(a) ∣∣ a,b ∈ Ind(U), r ∈ role(A∪ lhs(U)), r(a,b) /∈ rhs(U),¬r(a,b) /∈ rhs(U)}
and deﬁne Cbi in the same way as in Theorem 8 with the exception that Cbi contains one biimplication for each XC ,
C ∈ sub(A ∪ lhs(U)) and U is replaced by rhs(U) in the implication for XA and the biimplications for qualiﬁed number
restrictions. Let, as before, a∗ be a fresh individual name and u a fresh role name, and set
Arel =
{∀uw.Cbi(a∗) ∣∣ w ∈ path(A∪ lhs(U))}∪ {u(a∗,b) ∣∣ b ∈ Ind(A∪ lhs(U))}.
Instead of including U in A′ as in the case of unconditional updates, we have to make sure that only those updates are
triggered whose preconditions are satisﬁed. This can be achieved by the ABox
Acond =
⋃
ϕ/ψ∈U
{
a∗ : p̂(ϕ) → p(ψ)}∪
⋃
ψ∈rhs(U)∩O
{
a∗ :
(
⊔
ϕ/ψ∈U
¬̂p(ϕ)
)
→ (̂p(ψ) ↔ p(ψ))},
where O denotes the set of ABox assertions using concept and role names from A∪ lhs(U) only,
p(ϕ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
∃u.({a}  C) if ϕ = C(a)
∃u.({a}  ∃r.{b}) if ϕ = r(a,b)
∃u.({a}  ∀r.¬{b}) if ϕ = ¬r(a,b)
and p̂ is deﬁned like p, but with C replaced by XC and r by ρr . The ﬁrst line of Acond states that if ϕ holds in the original
interpretation, then ψ holds in the updated interpretation, for every ϕ/ψ ∈ U . The second line says that if none of the
preconditions of an assertion ψ holds in the original interpretation, then ψ holds in the updated interpretation if, and only
if, it holds in the original interpretation. Now set
A′ = Ainit ∪Ar ∪Arel ∪Acond.
In the same way as in the proof of Theorem 8, one can show that A ⇒pU A′ . Moreover, by construction, there is a
polynomial p such that |A′| p(|A| · |U |) and A′ can be computed in time p(|A′|). 
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also [25,26,14] for related work. The projection problem means to decide whether a given action achieves a given goal in a
given situation, i.e., whether the goal necessarily holds true after the execution of the action. It is one of the fundamental
problems in reasoning about action, and many other important reasoning problems can be reduced to it [7]. In the context
of a DL L, the projection problem for L can be formalized as deciding, given
• an L-ABox A that describes the situation in which the action is executed,
• a conditional L-update U that describes the action, and
• an L-ABox assertion ϕ that represents the goal,
whether for every model I of A it holds that IU | ϕ . In [12], algorithms for the projection problem for various DLs have
been given based on the approach of regression, according to which one rewrites ϕ to a new assertion ϕ′ such that ϕ′ is a
consequence of the initial ABox if, and only if, ϕ holds after the conditional update. In effect, one thus reduces the projection
problem to a standard reasoning problem for the initial ABox. The resulting algorithms yield tight upper complexity bounds
for the projection problem for all DLs between ALC and ALCQIO.
Theorem 11. (See [12].) The projection problem is
• PSpace-complete for ALC , ALCO, and ALCQO;
• ExpTime-complete for ALCI and ALCIO;
• co-NExpTime-complete for ALCQI and ALCQIO.
Interestingly, we obtain an alternative proof of the upper bounds stated in Theorem 11 from our results on projective
conditional updates. Let L be one of the DLs mentioned in the theorem. Given an L-ABox A, a conditional L-update U ,
and an L-ABox assertion ϕ , we can simply compute in polynomial time a projective update A′ of A with U that is of size
polynomial in the sizes of A and U and formulated in the extension LO of L with nominals (if not already present in L),
and then decide whether A′ | ϕ . We thus obtain a polynomial time reduction from projection in L to ABox consequence
in LO, a problem that is
• in PSpace if LO is ALCO or ALCQO [27];
• in ExpTime if LO is ALCIO [28];
• in co-NExpTime if LO is ALCQIO [29].
Thus, the upper bounds of Theorem 11 follow immediately. From the perspective of reasoning about action, this approach
corresponds to projection, i.e., instead of ‘regressing’ the goal ϕ back to the original ABox, we ’progress’ the original ABox
towards the goal.
We remark that the setup in [12] is somewhat more general than the one considered here as it adds acyclic TBoxes,
so-called occlusions as part of an action description that allows some concept/role memberships to change freely during the
execution of the action, and establishes the algorithms and complexity bounds for sequences of actions rather than single
ones. However, although it is out of the scope of the current paper to go into any details, we conjecture that our progression
approach can be generalized in a straightforward way to handle all of these extensions. In particular, sequences of actions
do not increase the complexity of progression-based projection, cf. the remark that closes Section 5.
Our proof of the upper bounds in Theorem 11 and the matching lower bounds provided in [12] also have an interesting
consequence from the ABox update perspective taken in this paper. To express projective updates of ABoxes in the DLs
ALC , ALCQ, ALCI , and ALCQI , thus overcoming the problems identiﬁed in Section 3, we have added nominals to
the respective languages in Section 5. In the cases of ALCI and ALCQI , this actually means switching to a language in
which the standard reasoning problems ‘ABox consistency’ and ‘ABox consequence’ have higher computational complexity:
in ALCI , ABox consequence is PSpace-complete whereas it is ExpTime-complete in ALCIO; in ALCQI , ABox conse-
quence is ExpTime-complete whereas it is co-NExpTime-complete in ALCQIO. Now, our proof of Theorem 11 and the
lower bounds stated there entail that such an increase in complexity between the language for initial ABoxes and the target
language for projective updates is unavoidable (modulo the assumption that the involved complexity classes are distinct) if
one wants projective updates to be of polynomial size and computable in polynomial time: for ALCI , a target language
with PSpace complexity would prove that the projection problem for ALCI is in PSpace, thus showing PSpace = ExpTime;
for ALCQI a target language with ExpTime complexity would prove that the projection problem for ALCQI is in ExpTime,
thus showing ExpTime= co-NExpTime.
7. Extensions and related work
We discuss some natural extensions of the framework considered in this paper, in particular with TBoxes and more
general forms of update. We also survey the relevant literature on updates in description logic and, to some reasonable
extent, updates in propositional logic.
2194 H. Liu et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 2170–21977.1. Extensions
As laid out in the introduction, this paper has concentrated on the rather special case of ABox updates where no domain
constraints are present (i.e., no TBox) and updates can only consist of ground literals. Both restrictions are severe from
the point of view of many applications, and thus it is natural to try and alleviate them. In both cases, this gives rise to
signiﬁcant new research challenges, and we only make some basic observations in what follows.
We ﬁrst consider updates that admit compound ABox assertions, i.e., updates are sets of possibly negated assertions C(a)
and r(a,b), where C can be a compound concept. Due to the presence of disjunction and existential restrictions, updates
can now be non-deterministic. Even in the propositional case, there is no one-and-only generally accepted semantics for
non-deterministic updates, which has led to many different proposals [8,4,30–34,7]. For the case of DLs, the beneﬁts and
drawbacks of the available semantics still remain to be investigated. Unfortunately, at least under the rather natural Winslett
PMA semantics [4], which is based on the idea of minimizing the changes between models of the original ABox and models
of the updated ABox, it is known that it is impossible to compute the result of updating an ALCQI-ABox and represent
it in a formalism for which the consequence problem is decidable—no matter whether semantic, projective, approximate,
or projective approximate updates are considered. This observation is a direct consequence of the result obtained in [27]
that the projection problem for ALCQI (as deﬁned in Section 6) under Winslett PMA semantics is undecidable. It does not
seem unlikely that other model-based update semantics induce similar computational problems. It remains an interesting
open problem, however, whether undecidability results can be established already for ALC and ALCI .
Next, we consider the addition of TBoxes to the framework studied in this paper. While doing so, we assume that updates
have the original restricted form, i.e., are sets of ground literals. We start with the simple case of acyclic TBoxes, where only
primitive concept names are allowed in the update, but no deﬁned ones—see [1] for details on these notions. It has been
shown in [15] how the construction of semantic updates presented in Section 4.1 can be adapted to this case, and how
acyclic TBoxes can help to achieve a more succinct presentation of updated ABoxes through structure sharing. All results
presented in this paper can be easily extended to acyclic TBoxes under the described restrictions of updates. When this
restriction is dropped, TBoxes (no matter whether acyclic, cyclic, or general) induce the same semantic and computational
problems as compound concepts in the update. In fact, instead of putting C(a) into the update with C a compound concept,
one can equivalently deﬁne the abbreviation A ≡ C in the TBox and then use the ground literal A(a) in the update. Thus, we
need an advanced semantics such as Winslett PMA and encounter the same computational problems that were described
above for updates with compound ABox assertions. We refer the interested reader to [35] for a pragmatic approach to this
problem in the context of projection.
7.2. Related work in propositional logic
We discuss the relationship between updates of DL ABoxes as investigated in this paper and the existing literature on
updates and revisions of propositional logic theories. Since propositional logic is expressively complete, which means that
every class of models can be described by a formula, the problem of non-expressibility of updates that we address in the
context of DLs does not exist there. For the same reason, in propositional logic there is no difference between approximate
and semantic updates. In contrast, the problem of determining the size of updated or revised propositional theories is of
great interest and has been extensively investigated. First examples of exponential blowups in the representation of revised
propositional theories were given by Nebel [36] and Winslett [4]. A systematic discussion of succinctness issues for a large
range of different update and revision operators is provided by Cadoli et al. in [9]. In fact, [9] seems to be the ﬁrst paper
to make the distinction between semantic and projective updates and to study the impact that this distinction has on the
size of updates.2 We note, however, that the special case of updates by literals (as studied in this paper) is not considered
in [9], where all considered forms of update may involve any propositional formula.
7.3. Related work in description logic
The update, revision and evolution of description logic knowledge bases has recently received considerable attention. In
our discussion, we focus on the update literature; summarizing the work on revision and evolution [41,42] is outside the
scope of this paper, but see [37–40] and [41,42], respectively.
Besides of the work presented here that is based on and extends [15], instance level updates have also been investigated
for knowledge bases formulated in variants of the DL-Lite family of description logics [11,43]. This family consists of inex-
pressive DLs tailored towards capturing conceptual modeling constructs while keeping reasoning, in particular conjunctive
query answering, of very low complexity [2]. Similarly to what we do in the current paper, Calvanese et al. [11,43] investi-
gate the problem of updating a DL-Lite ABox by ground literals. In addition, DL-Lite TBoxes serve as domain constraints. The
work presented in [11] assumes a model-based Winslett style semantics for updates and gives a variety of results on the
2 Note that Cadoli et al. use a slightly different terminology; e.g., they call an update operator query compactable if it has projective updates of polynomial
size and logically compactable if it has semantic updates of polynomial size. Thus, in the terminology of [9], we have shown that for DLs between ALCO
and ALCQIO@, the update operator considered in this paper is query compactable.
H. Liu et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 2170–2197 2195existence and size of semantic and approximate updates for the description logic DL-LiteF . Unfortunately, as observed in
[43], the fundamental algorithm computeUpdate of [11] is unsound and some expressivity results for Winslett style updates
in DL-LiteF claimed in [11] do not hold. To solve the resulting expressivity problems (as well as examples of non-intuitive
updates resulting from the interaction between the TBox and the updates), two formula-based approaches to instance level
updates under TBoxes in DL-Lite are proposed in [43]. For these approaches, updates of polynomial size exist. It would be
of interest to investigate in how far such formula-based approach can be extended to the expressive DLs considered in this
paper.
TBox level updates have received much less attention than instance level updates. A main reason may be that modiﬁ-
cations of the TBox are typically not the result of changes in the application domain, but rather invoked due to the TBox
engineer changing her understanding of the application domain. Thus, on the TBox level the belief revision problem seems
much more relevant than the update problem, and the former is governed by different principles. Some pros and cons of
model-based and formula-based semantics in this context are presented in [44].
8. Conclusion
We have studied updates of description logic ABoxes in the restricted, yet fundamental case where no compound con-
cepts are admitted in the ABox and no TBoxes are present. Our results show that, while many description logics do not
have updates, by choosing the right DL (one that includes nominals), it is possible to guarantee the existence of updates.
Moreover, by choosing the right notion of update (projective semantic), it is even possible to compute updated ABoxes in
polynomial time. We have also described an application of our results in reasoning about action.
Regarding future work, it would be interesting to study less restricted cases where the update U is allowed to contain
compound concepts and TBoxes are admitted. Note, though, that this involves some rather serious challenges that we have
identiﬁed and discussed in Section 6. It would also be interesting to consider ABox revision instead of ABox update, for
which a number of competing semantics are available; see [8,9] and references therein. We believe that the results and
techniques established in this paper would also be useful to deal with those semantics.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 2
Observation 1. E ⇒U E ′ .
Proof. Recall that
E = {john : ∃has-child.Happy, mary : Happy  Clever}
U = {¬Happy(mary)}
E ′ = {john : ∃has-child.(Happy unionsq {mary}), mary : ¬Happy  Clever}.
First, let I be a model of E . By deﬁnition of IU , we have maryIU /∈ HappyIU and maryIU ∈ CleverIU and thus the second
assertion of E ′ is satisﬁed. For the ﬁrst assertion, ﬁrst assume that there is a d ∈ HappyI with (johnI ,d) ∈ has-childI and
d = maryI . By deﬁnition of IU , we have johnIU ∈ (∃has-child.Happy)IU and thus the ﬁrst assertion is satisﬁed. If there is
no such d, then we must have (johnI ,maryI) ∈ has-childI = has-childIU . Thus johnIU ∈ (∃has-child.{mary})IU and the ﬁrst
assertion is satisﬁed.
Now let J be a model of E ′ . Let I be the interpretation obtained from J by setting HappyI = HappyJ ∪ {maryJ }. By
deﬁnition, IU = J and I satisﬁes the second assertion in E . Moreover, it is obvious that both johnJ ∈ (∃has-child.Happy)J
and johnJ ∈ (∃has-child.{mary})J , one of which must be the case, imply that I satisﬁes the ﬁrst assertion in E . 
Observation 2. E −→UALC E ′′ .
Proof. By Point 2 of Lemma 2, it is suﬃcient to show that the ABoxes
E ′ = {john : ∃has-child.(Happy unionsq {mary}), mary : ¬Happy  Clever}
E ′′ = {john : ∃has-child.(Happy unionsq Clever), mary : ¬Happy  Clever}
have the same ALC-consequences, i.e., E ′ | ϕ iff E ′′ | ϕ for all ALC-ABox assertions E . We have that E ′ | ϕ implies
E ′′ | ϕ since every model of E ′ is also a model of E ′′ . For the converse, let E ′′ | ϕ . If ϕ is a (possibly negated) role
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model I of E ′′ with aI0 /∈ CI0 . Deﬁne a new model J with J = I × Ind(A) by interpreting concept names A, role names
r, and individual names a as follows:
AJ = {(d,a) ∣∣ d ∈ AI and a ∈ Ind(E)}
rJ = {((d,a), (e,a)) ∣∣ (d, e) ∈ rI and a ∈ Ind(E)}
aJ = (aI ,a).
It can be proved by induction on the structure of C that d ∈ CI iff (d,a) ∈ CI for all d ∈ I , a ∈ Ind(E), and ALC-concepts
C . It follows that J | E ′′ and aJ0 /∈ CJ0 . If J is a model of E ′ , we are done. Otherwise, J | E ′′ and J | E ′ jointly imply
that there is a d ∈ (¬Happy  Clever)J such that (johnJ ,d) ∈ has-childJ . Distinguish the following two cases:
1. a0 = mary.
Then let J ′ be obtained from J by setting maryJ ′ = d. By construction and since J |A′′ , we have J ′ | E ′ . Moreover,
aJ
′
0 /∈ CJ
′
0 since a
J
0 /∈ CJ0 , aJ
′
0 = aJ0 , and C0 does not contain nominals.
2. a0 = mary.
Then let J ′ be obtained from J by setting has-childJ ′ = has-childJ ∪ {(johnJ ,maryJ )}. We have J ′ | E ′ and it
remains to show that maryJ ′ /∈ CJ ′0 . Let Ω denote the elements reachable in J ′ from mary, i.e., Ω is the smallest
set such that maryJ ′ ∈ Ω and if d ∈ Ω and (d, e) ∈ rI for some r ∈ NR , then e ∈ Ω . It can be shown by induction
on the structure of C that d ∈ CJ iff d ∈ CJ ′ for all d ∈ Ω and ALC-concepts C ; a crucial element of the proof is
the observation that, due to the deﬁnition of J and J ′ , johnJ ′ /∈ Ω . Obviously, aJ0 /∈ CJ then yields maryJ
′
/∈ CJ ′0 as
required. 
Lemma 6.
1. Let L be a DL between ALC and ALCQIO. Then for every Boolean L@-ABox, there exists an equivalent Boolean L-ABox;
2. Let L be a DL betweenALCO andALCQIO. Then for every Boolean L-ABox, there exists an equivalent non-Boolean L@-ABox.
Proof. Concerning (i), let A be a Boolean L@-ABox, and let ϕ be an assertion from A such that @bD is a subconcept of
some concept occurring in ϕ . Then the ABox A′ is obtained from A by replacing ϕ with (D(b) ∧ ϕ[	/@bD]) ∨ (¬D(b) ∧
ϕ[⊥/@bD]), where C[X/@bD] denotes the concept obtained from ϕ by replacing all occurrences of @bD with X . Using the
semantics, it is easy to see that A′ is equivalent to A. By iterating this replacement, we will eventually obtain a Boolean
L-ABox.
Concerning (ii), deﬁne a mapping ·∗ from ABox assertions in L to L@-concepts as follows:
C(a)∗ :=@aC
r(a,b)∗ :=@a∃r.{b}
¬r(a,b)∗ :=@a∀r.¬{b}.
The mapping is extended to Boolean ABox assertion ϕ as follows: ϕ∗ is the L@-concept obtained by replacing ∧ with ,
∨ with unionsq, and every assertion ψ with ψ∗ . Now, let A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} be a Boolean L-ABox. Deﬁne a non-Boolean L@-ABox
A′ := {(ϕ∗1 · · ·ϕ∗n )(a)}, where a is an arbitrary individual name. Using the semantics, it is easy to see that A′ is equivalent
to A. 
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